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I. INTRODUCTION
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has placed social jus-
tice on the environmental law and policy agenda. Soon after her appointment as
Administrator for the Environmental Protection Agency, Lisa Jackson an-
nounced the Agency's renewed commitment to environmental justice, which
she adopted as one of the Agency's seven priorities under her leadership.' What
began in the late 1970s as a grassroots movement is now part of the national
agenda. Policymakers and scholars have ceased debating whether low-income,
minority, and indigenous populations are disproportionately affected by envi-
ronmental hazards and have begun searching for solutions and formulating ap-
proaches. Today, protecting the "environment" means protecting not only pris-
tine national parks and open spaces, but also the places where people "live,
work, play, and learn." 2 It means thinking about the distributive effects of public
policies governing a range of environmental harms and benefits.
The EPA has taken steps in this direction in recent years. It now pro-
vides grants at the community and state levels to further environmental justice
initiatives that encourage local participation and collaborative problem solving.3
The Agency has also committed $1 million to fund environmental justice
projects in ten "showcase" communities across the nation,4 and in 2010, it
Associate Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. I would like to
thank the participants in the First Annual Fall Colloquium on Environmental Scholarship at Ver-
mont Law School for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I would also like to
thank Amanda Perry-Kessaris for her thoughtful comments and the Oklahoma City University
School of Law for supporting my work through the provision of a summer research grant.
I Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, EPA, Remarks to the Conference on Environmental Justice,
Air Quality, Goods Movement and Green Jobs (Jan. 25, 2010), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/8d49f7ad4bbcf4ef852573590040b7f6/59d30fl c468800
d5852576b6006bae3d!OpenDocument [hereinafter Jackson, Remarks]; see also Memorandum
from Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, EPA, to All EPA Employees, available at
http://blog.epa.gov/administrator/2010/01/12/seven-priorities-for-epas-future (discussing EPA's
seven priorities).
2 Jackson, Remarks, supra note 1. The environmental justice movement has long emphasized
the idea that environmental regulation should extend beyond protection of undeveloped open
spaces to protect the spaces where people live, work, and play.
Environmental Justice Grants and Programs, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/grants/index.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2011); see also
ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA's ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COLLABORATIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING
MODEL (2008), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/resources/publications/grants/cps-manual-
12-27-06.pdf.
4 Environmental Justice Showcase Communities, ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/grants/ej-showcase.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
The projects focus on local environmental issues ranging from Brownfield redevelopment and
reducing toxic exposure to development of urban agriculture and green jobs. And the EPA has
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awarded nearly $2 million in grants to fund community environmental justice
projects through its small grants program.' Moreover, in addition to focusing on
specific communities, the Agency is working on addressing environmental jus-
tice at all levels of decision making. For example, in March 2010, the EPA co-
sponsored a symposium to discuss ways environmental science and decision
making could better address social disparities in environmental health.6 And in
January of this year, the Agency announced a commitment of $7 million to fund
grants supporting research on the cumulative health risks that environmental
justice communities experience as a result of exposure to multiple sources of
pollution and other stressors.
Although the Agency has recognized the importance of environmental
justice at all levels, the academic scholarship on environmental justice has not
yet devoted serious attention to the question of how environmental justice con-
cerns can be incorporated into the rulemaking process. Because environmental
injustices often occur at the community level, it is not surprising that much of
the scholarship focuses on decisions regarding the siting of locally undesirable
land uses ("LULUs"), such as landfills and hazardous waste facilities.8 Indeed,
we might wonder whether concerns regarding environmental justice can be
meaningfully addressed at the policymaking level where agency decision mak-
ing is often informed by complex, quantitative assessments of health and envi-
ronmental risks, as well as economic analyses of the costs and benefits of pro-
posed rules.
indicated its desire to apply the knowledge gained from these projects to its future efforts to ad-
dress local environmental problems. Id.
5 Environmental Justice Small Grants Program, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, (Feb. 2011),
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/resources/publications/factsheets/fact-sheet-
ej-small-grant-01-2011 .pdf.
6 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UPDATE, STRENGTHENING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RESEARCH
AND DECISION MAKING: A SYMPOSIUM ON THE SCIENCE OF DISPROPORTIONATE ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH IMPACTS (June 28, 2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/multimedia/albums/epa/hundred-day-challenge.pdf.
7 EPA Awards $7 Million for Cumulative Risk Research, Env't Rep. Online (BNA) No. 42, at
78 (Jan. 14, 2011).
See, e.g., Eileen Gauna, LNG Facility Siting and Environmental (In)justice: Is It Time for a
National Siting Scheme?, 2 ENvTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 85 (2007); Richard D. Gragg, III et
al., The Location and Community Demographics of Targeted Environmental Hazardous Sites in
Florida, 12 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 1 (1996); Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating
Environmental Justice Into EPA Permitting Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 617 (1999); Matthew B.
Leveridge, Should Environmental Justice Be a National Concern? A Review and Analysis of
Environmental Justice Theories and Remedies, 15 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 107 (2000);
Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based Representation
and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329 (1995); Rodolfo Mata, Hazardous Waste
Facilities and Environmental Equity: A Proposed Siting Model, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 375 (1994).
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Consistent with its stated commitment, however, the EPA is considering
new possibilities for incorporating environmental justice into its rulemaking.9
For example, in response to a Sierra Club petition raising environmental justice
concerns, the EPA reconsidered its final rule revising the definition of solid
waste ("DSW rule").10 To address environmental justice concerns, in January
2010, the EPA published a draft environmental justice methodology for the
DSW rule, explaining that it views the eventual environmental justice analysis
as a "pilot project" toward developing a "systematic process to incorporate En-
vironmental Justice considerations within EPA's rulemaking procedures.""
After completing its environmental justice analysis of the rule, the EPA in-
cluded a detailed discussion of that analysis in its proposed revisions to the
DSW rule in July 2011.12 In addition, the EPA recently released a draft envi-
ronmental justice action plan and an interim guidance on incorporating envi-
ronmental justice concerns into its rulemaking process.' 3
Even though the EPA has recognized the need to incorporate environ-
mental justice concerns into its rulemaking process, it has also acknowledged
that there exists little "precedent for how to conduct an Environmental Justice
9 According to EPA Administrator Jackson, "[e]nvironmental justice is not an issue we can
afford to relegate to the margins. It has to be part of our thinking in every decision we make."
Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, EPA, Remarks to the National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council (July 7, 2009), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsfl8d49f7ad4bbcf4ef852573590040b7f6/313ec9a2bc8Od6
77852575fa007b3c42!OpenDocument. Similar public statements and actions underscore the
EPA's commitment to environmental justice under this Administration. See Federal Interagency
Working Group on Environmental Justice, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/interagency/index.html (last visited Oct. 13,
2011).
10 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE METHODOLOGY FOR THE
DEFINITION OF SOLID WASTE FINAL RULE (Jan. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-RCRA-2009-0315-0002 [hereinafter
EPA, DRAFT EJ METHODOLOGY]. The Agency estimated that the rule would exclude 1.5 million
tons of recycled hazardous secondary materials from the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act's ("RCRA's") cradle-to-grave regulations for hazardous waste. The Sierra Club argued that
the exclusion will disproportionately and adversely affect minority, low-income, and tribal popu-
lations. See Letter from Lisa Gollin Evans & Deborah Goldberg, Attorneys for Earthjustice, to
Lisa Jackson, Administrator, EPA, 8 (Jan. 29, 2009).
" EPA, DRAFT EJ METHODOLOGY, supra note 10, at 2. In June 2011, the EPA released a draft
environmental justice analysis for the DSW rule for public comment. See Definition of Solid
Waste (DSW) Rulemakings for RCRA Hazardous Waste Regulations, ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/hazard/dsw/rulemaking.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
12 Definition of Solid Waste, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,094, 44,103-08 (July 22, 2011) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 260, 261, 266).
13 ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT PLAN EJ 2014 (July 2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/policy/plan-ej-2014.pdf; ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA's ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: INTERIM GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERING
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTION (July 2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/policy/considering-ej-in-rulemaking-guide-
07-2010.pdf [hereinafter EPA, INTERIM EJ GUIDANCE].
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analysis in the context of a national rulemaking."l 4 In light of the EPA's recent
efforts and the renewed political will to integrate environmental justice concerns
into national policymaking, the time has come to think seriously about how ru-
lemakers should approach questions of environmental justice. This Article seeks
to fill this void by offering an approach to questions of environmental justice
that will guide policymakers in developing coherent methodologies and
processes for addressing environmental injustices in the rulemaking process.
The Article begins by asking whether environmental justice can find a
home in larger theories of political justice. This is an important inquiry because
in order to develop coherent environmental justice methodologies and
processes, we must first decide what environmental justice means. In other
words, before we can develop an approach that incorporates environmental jus-
tice into the rulemaking process, we should first locate the principles and con-
cerns central to environmental justice in a larger theoretical and conceptual
framework of justice.
To do this, I begin in Part II by investigating whether environmental
justice can be grounded in larger theories of political justice and, if so, what
effect this theoretical grounding has on how we approach questions of environ-
mental justice. I argue environmental scholarship and decision making often
approach questions of distributive justice by focusing on the distribution of
things-namely, the geographic distribution of environmental harms and bene-
fits-when we should be focusing on how these environmental harms and bene-
fits affect actual people. To facilitate our understanding of the actual human
impacts of environmental policies, I propose that we ground environmental jus-
tice in the capability approach to justice, an informational approach to evaluat-
ing social inequalities developed by Amartya Sen. Because the capability ap-
proach assesses inequalities by focusing on what people can actually do and be
(i.e., their well-being), it can tell us what we most need to know: how environ-
mental policies affect the lives of the most vulnerable populations. And by si-
tuating environmental justice within the capability approach, we can construct
the necessary methodologies for identifying, addressing, and evaluating envi-
ronmental injustices.
In Part III, I develop the capability approach to environmental justice by
discussing the ways in which the relevant information about human impacts can
be gathered, focusing especially on the importance of public participation and
deliberation in identifying and weighing the negative impacts of environmental
practices and policies. Part IV turns to the application of the approach in the
context of policy development and evaluation. I explain how the capability ap-
proach can help those engaged in environmental justice research understand the
reasons that factors, such as race and class, are linked to increased environmen-
tal and public health risks. In the second half of Part IV, I explain how the capa-
bility approach can improve the analysis of environmental justice during the
14 EPA, DRArr EJ METHODOLOGY, supra note 10, at 2.
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rulemaking process, focusing in particular on what a capability analysis can tell
us in comparison to the primary tool used to assess different policy options: a
cost-benefit analysis. In the final section, I use the approach to critique the
EPA's approach to environmental justice in its recently proposed regulation of
coal ash.
II. DEFINING THE JUSTICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORETICAL
FOUNDATIONS
In 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898, which in-
structs every federal agency to integrate environmental justice into its missions
"by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and ad-
verse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activ-
ities on minority populations and low-income populations."' 5 In addition to em-
phasizing the need for enforcement of health and environmental statutes, the
Order emphasizes the importance of public participation and improved research
regarding the health and environment of low-income and minority popula-
tions. 16 Moreover, both the Order and the accompanying presidential memo-
randum instruct agencies to consider not only the environmental and health ef-
fects, but also the economic and social consequences of strategies developed to
further environmental justice. 17
The EPA's definition of environmental justice builds upon the Execu-
tive Order's dual concern with the consequences of environmental policies (i.e.,
the potential for disproportionately high and adverse effects) and the processes
by which policies are implemented (i.e., public participation). Under the Agen-
cy's definition, environmental justice means the "fair treatment and meaningful
15 Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1-101, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994), as amended by Exec.
Order No. 12,948, 60 Fed. Reg. 6381 (Feb. 1, 1995). The Interagency Working Group on Envi-
ronmental justice defines "minority" according to membership in the following population groups:
"American Indian or Alaskan Native; Asian or Pacific Islander; Black, not of Hispanic origin; or
Hispanic." A "minority population" exists when "(a) the minority population of the affected area
exceeds 50 percent or (b) the minority population percentage of the affected area is meaningfully
greater than the minority population percentage in the general population or other appropriate unit
of geographic analysis." INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON ENVTL. JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR
FEDERAL AGENCIES ON KEY TERMS IN EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,898 (1995), reprinted in COUNCIL ON
ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: GUIDANCE UNDER
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, app. A, 25 (1997), available at
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/ej/justice.pdf.
16 Exec. Order No. 12,898, §§ 1-103(a), 3-3, 5-5, 59 Fed. Reg. 7630 (Feb. 11, 1994).
17 The presidential memorandum actually defines environmental effects to include "human
health, economic and social effects," which suggests that an agency should consider the economic
and social consequences of environmental policies and actions as part of an initial impact analysis
rather than simply considering the social and economic consequences of the agency's efforts to
address and mitigate disproportionate "environmental" impacts more narrowly defined to mean
disproportionate impacts to health. See Presidential Memorandum Accompanying Exec. Order
No. 12,898 (Feb. 11, 1994), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/resources/policy/clinton-memo_12898.pdf.
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involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income
with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environ-
mental laws, regulations, and policies." 18
Both "fair treatment" and "meaningful involvement" are further de-
fined:
* Fair treatment means that no group of persons should bear a
disproportionate share of the negative environmental conse-
quences resulting from industrial, governmental and commer-
cial operations or policies.
* Meaningful involvement means that: (1) people have an op-
portunity to participate in decisions about activities that may af-
fect their environment and/or health; (2) the public's contribu-
tion can influence the regulatory agency's decision; (3) their
concerns will be considered in the decision making process; and
(4) the decision makers seek out and facilitate the involvement
of those potentially affected.19
The EPA's definition of "fair treatment" is more than a guarantee of legal jus-
tice in the form of due process and equal protection: it addresses distributive
concerns central to social justice by promising a just distribution of environmen-
tal burdens throughout society 20 The definition of "meaningful involvement" is
also quite broad, requiring that public views not only be heard, but also be taken
seriously. 2'
In fact, as I explain below, the EPA's definition of these terms resonates
significantly with definitions of and demands for justice within the environmen-
tal justice movement,22 suggesting that the EPA's definition is responsive to the
18 EPA, DRAFT EJ METHODOLOGY, supra note 10, at 1. As the EPA acknowledges in the re-
cently released Interim EJ Guidance, the legal authority to address environmental justice issues is
based on existing statutes and regulations; the Executive Order cannot confer authority that is not
already granted by statute. See EPA, INTERIM EJ GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 5 (noting public-
health provisions of the Clean Air Act ("CAA") and RCRA that provide the EPA with broad
discretion to consider health impacts on minority, low-income, and indigenous populations); see
also Lazarus & Tai, supra note 8, at 625-50 (surveying federal statutory authority for considering
environmental justice in permitting).
19 EPA, DRAFT EJ METHODOLOGY, supra note 10, at 1.
20 See, e.g., DAVID MILLER, SOCIAL JUSTICE 22 (1979) (distinguishing between legal justice,
which includes criminal punishment and civil compensation in addition to legal procedures asso-
ciated with due process, and social justice, which concerns the institutional distribution of bene-
fits and burdens among members of society). The EPA's definition, which clearly contemplates a
kind of disparate impact analysis, follows somewhat surprisingly from the phrase "fair treatment,"
which by itself, implies a concern with different treatment, rather than disparate effects.
21 EPA, DRAFT EJ METHODOLOGY, supra note 10, at 1.
22 See infra Part II.C.3.
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movement's concerns and therefore a solid foundation on which to build a more
complete and structured theory of environmental justice that can guide agency
decision making at the national level. But to understand what "fair treatment"
means and what it requires, we must first ground it in a theory of justice. To do
this, I begin with a discussion of the empirical evidence underlying claims of
environmental injustice. I then ask whether we can situate these claims within a
larger theory of justice. I argue that although Rawls's theory of justice may ap-
pear to speak to these injustices, upon further analysis, it proves to be an un-
workable foundation for and approach to environmental justice. Because the
capability approach to justice focuses on real-world consequences and human
lives, it is the optimal approach to environmental justice in policymaking.
A. The Distribution ofEnvironmental Bads and Goods: Empirical Evi-
dence
The commitment that some groups not bear a disproportionate share of
negative environmental impacts is a commitment to a fair result: the equal dis-
tribution of environmental goods and bads. That is, the focus is on the outcome;
it is not enough to say that environmental hazards are distributed impartially
pursuant to a fair process because fairness is also judged by the end result. Giv-
en this focus, we might conclude that environmental justice is fundamentally
about fairness, or equity, in the distribution of social goods, namely environ-
mental burdens and benefits.
Indeed, questions of distribution dominate the academic literature on
environmental justice, which has been motivated, especially in the movement's
early years, by a desire to establish empirically that low-income and minority
communities are actually inequitably burdened by environmental hazards.23 And
the early studies did, in fact, demonstrate this correlation, especially with re-
spect to race. The seminal study, conducted by the General Accounting Office
("GAO," now the Government Accountability Office) was prompted by a non-
violent protest against the siting of a polychlorinated biphenyl ("PCB") landfill
in Warren County, North Carolina, a county with a large African American
population. The GAO concluded that although only one-fifth of the southern
region's population are African American, three of the four major offsite ha-
zardous waste facilities in the southern region were located in predominantly
African American communities.24 Research by professor-activist Robert Bullard
demonstrated similar racial disparities in the siting of solid waste disposal facili-
23 See DAVID SCHLOSBERG, DEFINING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES, MOVEMENTS, AND
NATURE 55 (2007) (noting that "the most often cited and most obvious, evidence ofenvironmental
injustice is in the realm of distribution-specifically the inequitable share of environmental ills
that poor communities and communities of color live with").
24 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 83-168
(1983).
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ties in Houston,2 5 and in 1987, the United Church of Christ's Commission for
Racial Justice published a study of the relationship between race and the loca-
tion of hazardous waste facilities that concluded that race was strongly corre-
lated with the location of these facilities throughout the nation.26
Since these early studies, scores of academic studies have documented
disparities in the distribution of environmental goods and bads according to race
and class. 27 In addition to demonstrating the unequal distribution of LULUs,
such as waste disposal facilities (landfills and incinerators), these studies docu-
ment the extent to which particular communities are exposed to disproportionate
risks and effects as a result of air, water, and land pollution. For example, Afri-
can American children and children from poor families are more likely to have
elevated blood lead levels. 28 Farm workers, the overwhelming majority of
whom are people of color, are disproportionately exposed to the 1.2 billion
pounds of pesticides that U.S. farmers use each year.2 9 Native American popula-
tions and other communities that consume greater quantities of fish than the
general population are disproportionately exposed to harmful contaminants,
such as dioxin and methylmercury. 3 0 Minority and poor communities are also
25 Bullard's research established that out of Houston's five-hundred neighborhoods, nine pre-
dominantly African American neighborhoods bear the burden for waste disposal in the form of
incinerators and landfills. Robert D. Bullard, Neighborhoods Zoned for Garbage, in THE QUEST
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 49 (Robert D.
Bullard ed., 2005); see also ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS &
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (3d. ed. 2000).
26 COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON RACIAL AND Socio-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987) [hereinafter Toxic WASTES AND RACE].
27 See SCHLOSBERG, supra note 23, at 56. The historical event often cited as the spark for the
class-based, antitoxics movement for environmental justice is the Love Canal event. See id at 47.
In 1978, residents of Love Canal, a suburb near Niagara Falls, realized they were living on top of
a toxic waste site where millions of pounds of hazardous chemicals had been dumped between
1947 and 1952. See CRAIG COLLINS, TOXIC LOOPHOLES: FAILURES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 80-81 (2010).
28 CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN, EILEEN GAUNA, & CATHERINE A. O'NEILL, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION 46 (2d ed. 2009) (citing a study that found that "children
from poor families are twice as likely to have elevated blood levels than those from higher income
families, and African American children are three to thirteen times more likely . . . to have ele-
vated levels); see also Glenn S. Johnson, Environmental Justice: A BrieffHistory and Overview, in
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON RACE, ETHNICITY,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 17, 23 (Filomina Chioma Steady ed., 2009) (noting that survey data pub-
lished in 1994 indicated that African American children were "lead poisoned at more than twice
the rate of non-Hispanic white children at every income level").
29 Ivette Perfecto & Baldemar Velasquez, Farm Workers: Among the Least Protected, 18
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY J. 13 (1992).
30 Catherine A. O'Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context: A Madness to EPA's
Method, 38 ENvTL. L. 495 (2008); Catherine A. O'Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental Stan-
dards, Contaminated Fish, and "Acceptable" Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3
(2000) [hereinafter O'Neill, Variable Justice].
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disproportionately affected by the environmental harms caused by disasters,
such as Hurricane Katrina and the recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill.3' Studies
also document the unequal distribution of environmental "goods," such as pub-
lic transportation and green spaces, 32 as well as the unequal application and en-
forcement of environmental laws.33
Although some scholars have questioned the methodology of these stu-
dies, 34 these critiques often challenge the idea that disparities are the result of
intentional racial discrimination, rather than the empirical conclusion that dis-
parities exist.35 And even those that challenge empirical claims that racial dis-
parities exist are simply few in number compared to studies that document dis-
parities. 36 In any event, the EPA and other governmental entitieS37 have ac-
31 See MANUEL PASTOR ET. AL., IN THE WAKE OF THE STORM: ENVIRONMENT, DISASTER, AND
RACE AFTER KATRINA (2006). Tragically, some of the same communities are suffering the effects
of both disasters. For example, the Atakapa-Ishak people, a small tribe in Grand Bayou, Louisi-
ana, who depend on the coastal waters for food, livelihood, and recreation, await the impacts of
the oil disaster even as they continue to recover from Katrina's devastation. John Burnett, Oil
Imperils Native American Town, and Way ofLife, NPR ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (June 17, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=127902879&ft- 1&f-1003.
32 See Robert D. Bullard et al., The Routes ofAmerican Apartheid, F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB.
POL'Y 66 (2000); Jennifer Wolch et al., Parks and Park Funding in Los Angeles: An Equity-
Mapping Analysis, 26 URB. GEOGRAPHY 4 (2005).
33 Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection, NAT'L L.J. Si (1992) (noting the
"racial divide in the way the U.S. government cleans up toxic waste sites and punishes polluters").
34 Much of the debate involves quantitative studies of the siting of hazardous waste facilities.
Results of large studies regarding siting depend on the chosen geographic unit of analysis. Com-
pare Toxic WASTES AND RACE, supra note 26 (finding racial disparities using zip code areas),
with Douglas L. Anderton et al., Environmental Equity: The Demographics of Dumping, 31
DEMOGRAPHY 229 (1994) (finding no racial disparities in siting of treatment, storage, and disposal
facilities ("TSDFs") using census tracts). See also Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of Environ-
mental Justice, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 20 (1995) (analyzing methodologies in studies of
the siting of hazardous waste facilities conducted by the Social and Demographic Research Insti-
tute and the UCC Commission); Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going
to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1997) (finding that race is a predictor of the presence of a TSDF, but poverty is not); Paul Mohai
& Robin Saha, Racial Inequality in the Distribution of Hazardous Waste: A National-Level Reas-
sessment, 54 Soc. PROBS. 343 (2007) (finding racial and income disparities in the location of
TSDFs using "distance-based methods").
35 See, e.g., Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Dispro-
portionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994) (theorizing that disproportio-
nate distribution of LULUs may result from market forces that cause individuals with less income
to migrate to neighborhoods with LULUs because of cheaper housing). Compare Bullard, supra
note 25 (arguing that City of Houston pursued an intentionally discriminatory policy-PIBBY
(Put it in Blacks' Backyard)-for waste disposal sites), with Been, Analyzing Evidence of Envi-
ronmental Justice, supra note 34, at 20 (concluding that "environmental injustice is not a simplis-
tic PIBBY-'put it in Black's backyards,"' but is likely "a much more ambiguous and complicated
entanglement of class, race, educational attainment, occupational patterns, relationships between
the metropolitan areas and rural or non-metropolitan cities, and possibly market dynamics").
36 There are too many studies documenting the inequitable distribution of environmental ha-
zards to list here. For example, a recent study found that African Americans were significantly
58 [Vol. 1 14
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knowledged the strength of the empirical evidence and have repeatedly ex-
pressed a clear commitment to addressing environmental injustice. The relevant
question now is how to address environmental injustice. To answer this ques-
tion, we must first define environmental justice by situating it within a larger
theory of justice. Given the focus in the literature on the unequal distribution of
environmental hazards and benefits, I turn now to the question of whether envi-
ronmental justice can be grounded in a theory of distributive justice and, if so,
which theory provides the best foundation.
B. Theorizing Fair Distribution
As the previous section demonstrates, the environmental justice litera-
ture is predominantly concerned with distribution, particularly with demonstrat-
ing that environmental hazards are disproportionately located in communities of
color and poorer communities. As David Schlosberg explains, "from this pers-
pective, environmental inequality occurs when the costs of environmental risk,
and the benefits of good environmental policy, are not shared across the demo-
,,38graphic and geographic spectrums. In this respect, environmental justice re-
flects what many political theorists understand to be the fundamental (and per-
more likely to live within a mile of an industrial pollution facility. Paul Mohai et al., Racial and
Socioeconomic Disparities in Residential Proximity to Polluting Industrial Facilities: Evidence
From the Americans' Changing Lives Study, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S649 (2009), available at
http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/files/mohai-ej-article.pdf. For other examples, see
ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., Toxic WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY: 1987-2007 (2007), available
at http://www.ucc.org/assets/pdfs/toxic20.pdf; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACTORS FOR INDENTIFYING
AND ASSESSING DISPROPORTIONATE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH IMPACTS 2 n.5 (2007) (listing stu-
dies); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence, in RACE
AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 163 (Bunyan Bryant &
Paul Mohai eds., 1992) (finding race and income to be related to pollution exposure); ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES (1992) (con-
cluding that low-income and minority populations are disproportionately exposed to certain envi-
ronmental hazards, but insufficient data exists to determine whether these populations suffer dis-
parate health impacts). In addition, numerous qualitative case studies describe environmental
injustice in context. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES ON RACE, ETHNICITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Filomina Chioma Steady ed., 2009)
(containing case studies from various countries, including the United States); THE QUEST FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION (Robert D. Bullard
ed., 2005) (containing case studies from a range of places, including Louisiana's "Cancer Alley,"
Los Angeles, the New Jersey waterfront, and South Africa, and focusing on the struggles of vari-
ous communities, including African American, Native, and Chicano communities).
37 See, e.g., Robert W. Collin, Environmental Justice in Oregon: It's the Law, 38 ENvTL. L.
413 (2008) (discussing state-level environmental justice initiatives in Oregon).
3 SCHLOSBERG, supra note 23, at 56; see also KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETTE, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: CREATING EQUALITY, RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY 24 (2005) ("Distributive justice is essen-
tial to the search for environmental justice because it requires a fair or equitable distribution of
society's technological and environmental risks and impacts.").
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haps sole) subject of justice: the fair distribution of burdens and benefits in so-
ciety.39
A fair distribution of environmental bads and goods arguably requires
the equal distribution of these burdens and benefits. 4 0 Theories of distributive
justice recognize, however, that inequalities invariably exist in the distribution
of social goods and are permissible if morally justified. The justifications for
these inequalities exemplify the central differences in distributive theories.
Amartya Sen illustrates these differences with a story about three children and a
flute.4' One child justifies her claim to the flute because she is the only one of
the three who can play and would therefore receive the most pleasure from own-
ing the flute. 4 2 Another child claims the flute on the ground that he is impove-
rished and has no toys of his own; the flute would therefore increase his happi-
ness and his share of economic goods.43 The third child demands the flute be-
cause she actually made the flute; she therefore has a right to the flute because it
is the product of her own labor.44 How we resolve the question of which child
receives the flute will likely depend on whether we favor utilitarian, economic
egalitarian, or libertarian conceptions of justice.4 5
These differing conceptions of justice are notoriously difficult to recon-
cile. Claims regarding environmental justice, however, are most analogous to
the claim that the second child makes; that is, environmental equality is pre-
mised on a commitment to egalitarianism in some form. When we ask how to
address the inequalities in environmental distribution, we are not concerned with
maximizing the utility (pleasure or some other measure of well-being) of the
overall community as in the case of utilitarianism because the maximization of
overall utility may actually come at the expense of those most vulnerable. 4 6 Si-
milarly, in privileging individual entitlements and property rights, libertarianism
3 SCHLOSBERG, supra note 23, at 12; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 59
(Erin Kelly ed., 2001) ("The two principles of justice assess the basic structure according to how it
regulates [distributes] citizens' share of primary goods . . . .") [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS]; JEAN HAMPTON, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 122 (Westview Press 1997) (noting that dis-
tributive justice "has been the most dominant part of political theory since the late 1960s").
40 In other words, fairness requires what Aristotle termed an "equal share for equal people."
For Aristotle, distributive justice and the fairness it entails require an "equal share for equal
people" of anything that can be divided (e.g., honors, wealth) among members of a political com-
munity. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS § 5.43 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985).
41 AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 12-14 (2009) [hereinafter SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE].




4 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
xxxiii, xlvii (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1982) (explaining that although "in the calculation of
what will maximize aggregate welfare men are to be treated as equals in the sense that the same
weight is to be given to their equal pleasures or pains whoever they are, the outcome of such cal-
culations may be grossly unequal").
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tolerates inequitable distributions of social goods and does not require equal
distribution of environmental resources (although some versions require those
who appropriate these resources to compensate others whose use is precluded).47
If we are committed to equal distribution of environmental goods and bads, we
are espousing an egalitarian view.
Of course, egalitarian views of justice vary as well, and most accept that
some inequalities are nonetheless fair, although they differ in the distributive
principles that determine what is fair, or "morally relevant." For example, Aris-
totle would give the flute to the child who can play because she can best realize
the flute's purpose. 48 That is, fair distribution turns on the nature of what is be-
ing distributed such that the distribution "fits a person's worth" (e.g., the best
flutes to the best flute players). 4 9 Ronald Dworkin's "resource egalitarianism"
would require that individuals be given roughly equal means so that they have
an equal opportunity to spend in acquiring the resources they desire, thereby
ensuring that inequalities are a product of people's voluntary choices.o It is
difficult to see, however, how either theory could provide a useful approach to
analyzing the inequitable outcomes of environmental policies. Certain people do
not deserve a greater share of environmental benefits, such as clean air and wa-
ter, in an Aristotelian sense; in this case, strict equality is required. But simply
committing ourselves to strict equality does not tell us how to measure and ad-
dress existing inequalities and therefore provides insufficient guidance for poli-
cymaking. Resource egalitarianism may require a redistribution of income or
wealth in order to compensate for unequal distribution, but like libertarianism, it
is less useful in addressing the distribution of public goods, such as public poli-
cies that prevent and control pollution."
This is perhaps why John Rawls's theory of justice (and especially his
second principle of justice, the difference principle) is the distributive theory
most often cited and explored by environmental justice scholars.5 2 According to
Rawls, social and economic inequalities are just only if they are attached to po-
47 I am thinking here, for example, of Robert Nozick's use of the Lockean proviso whereby
those who appropriate natural resources compensate others so that they are not in a worse position
than if the resources had not been appropriated. See, e.g., ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND
UTOPIA (1974).
48 ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS bk. II, at 351-52 (W.D. Ross ed., Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed., 1998).
49 ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, § 5.42.
so RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 70
(2000). Through various policies, for example taxation policies, the government can attempt to
give individuals the equal shares that allow them to pursue their goals. See id. at 99-108.
5' Id. at 65 (explaining that equality of resources is concerned with equality in privately owned
resources and does not address questions regarding publicly or commonly owned resources).
52 See, e.g., Kristen Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-offs in
Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1481, 1541-
43 (1995); Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1031, 1064
(2003); Giancarlo Panagia, Tot Capita Tot Sententiae: An Extension or Misapplication of Rawl-
sian Justice, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 283 (2005).
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sitions and offices equally open to everyone (the fair equality of opportunity
principle) and are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (the difference
principle).53 The relevant inequalities assessed according to the difference prin-
ciple are "differences in citizens' reasonable expectations of primary goods [in-
cluding income and wealth] over a complete life."S4 The primary goods of in-
come and wealth may include entitlements, such as health care, as well as public
goods, such as environmental policies ensuring the clean air and water neces-
sary for public health. 5
Because the difference principle requires policies that benefit the least-
advantaged members of society as much as possible and the conception of "pri-
mary goods" includes public goods, such as environmental policies, Rawls's
theory seems to provide a means to both identify environmental injustice and
remedy it. But as we will see, the difference principle cannot help policymakers
address existing inequalities in the absence of "background procedural jus-
tice,"56 and the concept of primary goods does not necessarily provide all the
relevant information policymakers need to assess the impact of environmental
policies on vulnerable communities. Moreover, the difference principle and
primary-goods concept of environmental goods do not fully capture the under-
standing of environmental justice as it is articulated by different strains of the
environmental justice movement. I address all three concerns in the sections that
follow.
1. The Background Conditions for Application of the Difference
Principle
In his well-known theory of justice as fairness, John Rawls asserts that
the following two principles of justice could be accepted by free and equal citi-
zens as the terms of a fair system of social cooperation, that is, as governing the
basic structure of society: 7
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully ade-
quate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compati-
ble with the same scheme of liberties for all; and
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two condi-
tions: first, they are to be attached to office and positions open
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity [the fair
5 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 39, at 42-43.
54 Id. at 59.
5 Id. at 172; John Rawls, Fairness to Goodness, 84 PHIL. REV. 536, 540-42 (1975).
56 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 39, at 51.
5 The basic structure refers to a society's main political and social institutions, including the
structure of the economy and the family, and the way in which they fit together in a system of
social cooperation. Id. at 10.
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equality of opportunity principle]; and second, they are to be to
the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society
(the difference principle)."
Rawls assigns a strict ordering to these principles: the first principle has
lexical priority over the second, and within the second principle, fair equality of
opportunity has priority over the difference principle. Consequently, the differ-
ence principle may be applied only if the other principles are satisfied. It is a
principle of distribution that functions only "within the setting of background
institutions that secure the basic equal liberties . . . as well as fair equality of
opportunity." 9
Thus, the difference principle may be meaningfully applied only if all
citizens enjoy equal basic liberties, which Rawls specifies with a rather exten-
sive list: "freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; political liberties ...
and freedom of association, as well as the rights and liberties specified by the
liberty and integrity (physical and psychological) of the person; and finally, the
rights and liberties covered by the rule of law." 60 In addition, the condition of
fair equality of opportunity must be satisfied, meaning that all citizens, regard-
less of social class, have a fair opportunity to succeed (in attaining public offices
and social positions). 6 1 Provided these conditions are met, the difference prin-
ciple may be applied to ensure a just distribution of social goods, namely a dis-
tribution in which inequalities work to the advantage of everyone and especially
benefit the least-advantaged members of society.62
But without these conditions, the difference principle is not a workable
distributive principle for law- and policy-making. 63 Rawls explains that an ef-
fective system of cooperation "always gives a greater return to the less advan-
taged for any given return to the more advantaged."" So, how would the differ-
ence principle help address the inequalities in a system of cooperation that re-
sembles that of the United States-in which the more advantaged enjoy a much
greater share than the less advantaged?65 Rawls's response is that this system
58 Id. at 42-43.
s9 Id. at 43.
60 Id. at 44.
61 Id. at 43-44.
62 As Rawls explains, although the first principle applies to constitutional essentials, the dif-
ference principle applies at the legislative stage and "bears on all kinds of social and economic
legislation." Id at 48. This would, of course, include environmental legislation and its attendant
regulation.
63 Id. at 67.
6 Id. at 63.
65 The significant disparity in wealth distribution in the United States is well documented, and
the gap has only grown in recent years. See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality
in the United States, 1913-1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 31 (2003) (noting that "[m]any studies have
documented the increase in inequality in the United States since the 1970s"); see also Emmanuel
632011]
15
Roesler: Addressing Environmental Injustices: A Capability Approach to Rul
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011
WEST VIRGINIA LAW RE VIEW
would not occur in a society that has the background institutions establishing the
basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, as required by the other prin-
ciples.66 These conditions ensure the open competition necessary to keep the
ratio between the more and less advantaged within a just range. But a society
with these background institutions is an ideal society, far removed from the so-
cial and political realities that exist today.
Furthermore, in real-world societies that lack the background condi-
tions, the logic of the difference principle is easily manipulated to support envi-
ronmental injustices. In her study of environmental justice, Kristin Shrader-
Frechette identifies two related economic arguments that seek to justify envi-
ronmental inequalities as benefiting everyone, especially the least advantaged:
(1) to the extent environmental inequalities promote economic growth, this will
ensure the disadvantaged have a decent standard of living; 68 and (2) this eco-
nomic growth will reduce inequalities in wealth and income over time. 6 9 We
might add to this the economic argument that increases in wealth and income
benefit the poor more than the rich because marginal increases in wealth are
more valuable to the poor. As Shrader-Frechette notes, these arguments have
Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Update with 2007
Estimates) (Aug. 5, 2009), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/saez-UStopincomes-
2007.pdf (noting that "in the economic expansion of 2002-2007, the top 1 percent captured two
thirds of income growth").
66 This is also the reason Rawls does not address racial and gender discrimination; in an ideal
society with basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, such discrimination would not exist.
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 39, at 65-66.
67 Id. at 67. Rawls's discussion is based on the "simplest" form of the difference principle,
whereby we identify the "least advantaged" as "those who share with other citizens the basic
equal liberties and fair opportunities but have the least income and wealth." Id. at 65. Of course,
unlike wealth and income, inequalities in the distribution of environmental goods are not morally
relevant or justifiable in the same way-that is, on the grounds of individual desert or as social
incentives to some other end. We can comfortably demand strict equality in the distribution of
environmental goods and bads. In fact, in an ideal society with Rawls's background procedural
justice, we would have little need to apply the difference principle to environmental policies; the
background institutions would theoretically ensure their fair distribution.
68 SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 38, at 30-31. In fact, some have made the rather startling
argument that environmental regulation is deadly because it decreases wealth, which is tied to
health and longevity. Rena Steinzor has highlighted the dubious assumptions underlying these
claims. RENA I. STEINZOR, MOTHER EARTH AND UNCLE SAM: How POLLUTION AND HOLLOW
GOVERNMENT HURT OUR KIDS 168 (2008); see also David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of
Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 57 (2005) (explaining that "marginal
differences in income have little effect upon health" and noting that "environmental regulation,
even costly regulation, does not necessarily diminish wealth"). Longevity may be affected by
income levels, but other variables matter as well. See SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 226-
27 ("Freedom from premature mortality is, of course, by and large helped by having a higher
income (that is not in dispute), but it also depends on many other features, particularly of social
organization, including healthcare, the assurance of medical care, the nature of schooling and
education, the extent of social cohesion and harmony, and so on.").
69 SHRADER-FRECHETrE, supra note 38, at 30-31.
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serious problems. First, it is not clear that environmental regulation inhibits eco-
nomic growth.70 Second, it is far from clear that the less advantaged will benefit
from economic growth should growth occur.7
The most important point from the standpoint of environmental justice
is that by characterizing the distributive question as one of relative benefit, we
achieve little and often end up justifying the status quo. In the context of envi-
ronmental regulation, pollution-control standards technically benefit everyone,
including the least advantaged. Indeed, in promulgating health-based ambient
air quality standards for ozone, the EPA concluded that its new standards will
benefit everyone, including minority and low-income populations: "EPA has
determined that this final rule will not have disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects on minority or low-income populations
because it increases the level of environmental protection for all affected popu-
lations ... 72 In other words, because the rule strengthens environmental pro-
tection for all, there is simply no environmental justice issue: everyone wins.
If this is the approach to environmental justice in rulemaking, environmental
justice concerns will have no bearing on national health-based standards, as long
as standards stay the same or improve.
This logic can infect permit decisions as well. The well-known Select
Steel decision 7 4 is a good example. Select Steel is a rare administrative resolu-
tion on the merits of a complaint based on the EPA's regulations under Title VI,
which prohibits discrimination by entities that receive federal funding." The
70 Id. at 31.
71 Id.
72 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16, 436, 16,507 (Mar. 27,
2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 58). In 2010, the EPA reconsidered the ozone standards and
proposed new standards more protective of human health. See EPA, National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 2938 (Jan. 19, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 58). The
environmental justice analysis in the proposed rule is the same, however. Id. at 3040 (concluding
that the "proposed rule will not have disproportionately high and adverse human health or envi-
ronmental effects on minority or low-income populations because it increases the level of envi-
ronmental protection for all affected populations").
73 The EPA has reached this conclusion in its analysis of the impact of other CAA rules. See,
e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The CAIR RIA: Advocacy Dressed Up as Policy Analysis, in REFORMING
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 56, 61, 69 (Winston Harrington et al. eds., 2009); Catherine A.
O'Neill, The Mathematics of Mercury, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra, at
123-25 [hereinafter O'Neill, The Mathematics of Mercury].
74 See Letter from Anne E. Goode, Director, EPA Office of Civil Rights, to Father Phil
Schmitter & Sister Joanne Chiaverini, Co-Directors, St. Francis Prayer Center, & Russell Harding,
Director, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (Oct. 30, 1998) [hereinafter Select Steel
letter].
7 Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 601-02, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). In 2003, more than 100
Title VI complaints had been filed with the EPA's Office of Civil Rights over the course of ten
years, but only fourteen or so had been decided on the merits, and they were decided in favor of
the regulatory agency engaging in the allegedly discriminatory conduct. See Eileen Gauna &




Roesler: Addressing Environmental Injustices: A Capability Approach to Rul
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
EPA's regulations prohibit not only intentional discrimination, but also discri-
minatory effects (i.e., adverse disparate impacts). The complainants alleged
that the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality ("MDEQ") was violat-
ing Title VI regulations because the issuance of a PSD (prevention of significant
deterioration) permit for the proposed Select Steel facility would have discrimi-
natory effects.n The EPA's decision that the MDEQ did not violate Title VI or
the EPA's implementing regulations turned in large part on its conclusion that
Select Steel's potential emissions would not cause the area to violate health-
based standards, including national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS")
for ozone and lead under the Clean Air Act ("CAA").7 ' The EPA reasoned that
because health-based standards are "presumptively sufficient" to protect every-
one's health within an adequate margin of safety, no population would suffer
adverse impacts from the increased emissions, and if no one suffers an adverse
impact, then no one suffers a discriminatory effect. 79 This underlying logic-
that environmental regulation is to the benefit of all-serves only to sustain the
status quo of environmental inequalities and fails to address existing dispari-
ties.80
76 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b). The case was decided under EPA's Interim Guidance for Investigating
Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits. In 2000, the EPA replaced the Interim
Guidance with two draft guidances, including one governing the investigation of complaints. See
Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering Environmental Permitting
Programs and Draft Revised Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Chal-
lenging Permits, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,649 (June 27, 2000) [hereinafter Title VI Draft Guidance].
n OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT FOR TITLE VI
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT (SELECT STEEL COMPLAINT) 1, available at
http://www.epa.gov/ocr/docs/ssdecir.pdf.
78 See Select Steel letter, supra note 74, at 3-5.
79 Id. at 3. This reasoning is consistent with the analysis set out in the Title IV Draft Guidance,
which provides that compliance with the health-based national ambient air quality standards
("NAAQS") establishes a rebuttable presumption: "if an investigation includes an allegation rais-
ing air quality concerns regarding a pollutant regulated pursuant to a primary NAAQS, and where
the area in question is attaining that standard, the air quality in the surrounding community will
generally be considered presumptively protective and emissions of that pollutant should not be
viewed as 'adverse' within the meaning of Title VI." Title VI Draft Guidance, 65 Fed. Reg. at
39,680. The Draft Guidance has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Alex Geisinger, Rethinking
Environmental Justice Regulation: A Modest Proposal for Penalty Return, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV.
33, 43 (2004) (noting that the guidance has been criticized because it establishes burdensome
standards and procedures that make a disparate impact finding unlikely); Bradford C. Mank, The
Draft Title VI Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidances: Too Much Discretion for EPA and
a More Difficult Standard for Complainants?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,144 (2000) (criticizing the
guidances for failing to establish clear standards and discussing objections raised by environmen-
tal justice advocates).
so In addition, health-based standards may be inadequate for all populations. See, e.g., W.
Lawrence Beeson et al., Long-Term Concentrations of Ambient Air Pollutants and Incident Lung
Cancer in California Adults: Results from the AHSMOG Study, 106 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 813
(1998) (finding that study participants had an increased risk of cancer from ozone and other air-
borne pollutants from exposures at or below the EPA's health-based standards).
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2. Primary Goods: Is This All We Need to Know?
Even if we could guarantee background procedural justice, the differ-
ence principle would fail to address environmental injustice because it does not
tell us everything we need to know to choose among social policies. Rawls ex-
plains that the difference principle is a principle of social choice requiring com-
parisons:
To say that inequalities in income or wealth are to be arranged
for the greatest benefit of the least advantaged simply means
that we are to compare schemes of cooperation by seeing how
well off the least advantaged are under each scheme, and then to
select the scheme under which the least advantaged are better
off than they are under any other scheme.
To choose among environmental policies, we would therefore assess each policy
according to how it regulates citizens' shares of primary goods, including public
goods, such as pollution-control measures, and choose the policy that benefits
the least advantaged the most.82 But in focusing solely on the goods being dis-
tributed, rather than on people's diverse and varying needs, we gather only part
of the information we need to make policy decisions.
The primary goods approach suffers from an information deficit be-
cause it glosses over important variations among groups of people due to both
intrinsic and acquired characteristics.83 Intrinsic differences resulting from ge-
netic factors, as well as age, gender, and race, will determine the level of advan-
tage a person enjoys from an environmental measure.84 For example, children
and the elderly are more vulnerable than other populations to the effects of cer-
tain air pollutants, and people who have sickle-cell anemia are more vulnerable
to the effects of carbon monoxide.85 Acquired differences resulting from the
differences in people's lived experiences-for example, in their ability to access
adequate health care and proper nutrition-similarly affect their level of advan-
tage with respect to environmental goods and exacerbate the burdens imposed
by environmental bads.86 Such deprivations are too often a reality in low-
income and minority communities, making them more susceptible to the risks
81 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 39, at 59-60.
82 Id. at 172.
83 Carl F. Cranor, Risk Assessment, Susceptible Subpopulations, and Environmental Justice, in
THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS
DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 341, 344 (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008); Ro-
bert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U.
ILL. L. REV. 103 (1996).
8 Cranor, supra note 83, at 344.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 345.
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and negative effects of environmental hazards. In addition to increased suscepti-
bility, these communities are also subject to greater exposures through multiple
sources of pollution.
As Amartya Sen has argued, the failure to account for human diversity
results from the use of primary goods as the metric by which to measure social
advantage. By not attending to the diversity in people's characteristics and so-
cial conditions, a focus on primary goods obscures the ways in which people
convert these goods into actual opportunities.88 In focusing on the means of liv-
ing, we miss, according to Sen, what matters most: whether individuals have the
opportunity to achieve particular ends, such as good health and fitness. 89 For
example, a person may have a high income, but she may have difficulty convert-
ing the income (the means of living) into the ends she has reason to value be-
cause of a persistent illness or physical disability. 90 If we evaluate inequalities
using social goods or resources as a measure, we will not see how this person is
disadvantaged and will fail to take this social inequality into account when mak-
ing political decisions. 91
Environmental decision making reflects this reductive vision of the in-
dividual when it sets standards based on the "average" person, ignoring differ-
ences in susceptibility and exposure across communities. 92 Catherine O'Neill
has, for example, criticized the fish consumption rate of 6.5 grams per day,
which the EPA has used to set water quality standards that regulate levels of
harmful contaminants, such as mercury, PCBs, and dioxins. 93 Because it is
based on studies of the general population, this consumption rate does not re-
flect consumption by particular populations, such as subsistence fishers and
some Native American populations. 94 Similarly, as noted above, the EPA's en-
87 Id.
88 SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 261.
89 Id. at 233-34.
90 Id.
91 As Sen explains in his well-known lecture Equality of What?, a person in a wheelchair
requires more social resources than an able-bodied person, and yet, the difference principle would
not result in that person's receiving more or less on the grounds of the disability. Amartya Sen,
Equality of What?, in AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 353, 365 (1982)
[hereinafter Sen, Equality of What]. Martha Nussbaum extends this critique, arguing that Rawls's
focus on income and wealth suggests that social inequalities can be addressed simply by distribut-
ing more of these resources. But even if we give the person in the wheelchair more money so she
may hire others to assist her, we will not have guaranteed her adequate access to public spaces, "a
public task, which requires public planning and a public use of resources." MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 168 (2006).
Similarly, in focusing on income and wealth as means to address environmental injustice, we will
not guarantee those especially burdened by environmental hazards a healthier environment-
which is also a public task requiring public planning and public use of resources.
92 Cranor, supra note 83, at 363-64.
9 O'Neill, Variable Justice, supra note 30, at 43-44.
94 Id. at 54. The EPA has since revised the fish consumption rate to 17.5 grams per day for the
general population and 142.4 grams per day for subsistence fishers, but states have been slow to
68 [Vol. 114
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 114, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol114/iss1/5
2011] ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICES 69
vironmental justice analysis for its 2008 revision to the NAAQS governing
ozone does not reflect agency consideration of the needs of members of low-
income and minority communities who may be exposed to multiple sources of
air pollution.95 Of course, by focusing on the good being distributed (in this
case, improved air quality), rather than the affected communities, the rule may
technically be of greater benefit to the least advantaged, provided the least ad-
vantaged live in areas with the poorest air quality. 96 But this analysis does not
tell us whether and to what extent the rule will actually improve the lives of the
least advantaged; relevant information is missing from the analysis.
Furthermore, in the context of permitting decisions at the local level, a
focus on what is being distributed (e.g., a hazardous waste facility or an under-
ground injection well) also tends to circumscribe the information decision mak-
ers consider. Decisions issued by the Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB")
resolving environmental justice challenges to permit decisions illustrate this
tendency. 9 7 In these decisions, adverse environmental impacts are tied, as Shei-
revise their water quality standards according to the new rates. See OFFICE OF WATER, ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING CHEMICAL CONTAMINANT DATA FOR USE IN FISH




9 See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: EPA SHOULD DEVOTE
MORE ATTENTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE WHEN DEVELOPING CLEAN AIR RULES 17-18
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05289.pdf. Even when CAA rules would
arguably result in adverse impacts to environmental justice communities, the EPA has down-
played these impacts and relied on optimistic assumptions to dismiss environmental justice con-
cerns. For example, in analyzing the impacts of a rule designed to control emissions for new mo-
tor vehicles, the EPA estimated that the rule could result in net increases in emissions of nitrogen
oxides and volatile organic compounds, which lead to higher levels of ozone, in twenty-six of
eighty-six counties. But despite this finding, the EPA concluded that the benefits of the rule would
outweigh the increases in the "vast majority" of relevant communities. Id. (citing AIR &
RADIATION, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TIER 2 MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS STANDARDS AND GASOLINE
SULFUR CONTROL REQUIREMENTS: RESPONSE TO COMMENTS 20-22 (1999), available at
http://www.epa.gov/tier2/f-m/rtc/tr2-rtc.pdf). In responding to the GAO's investigation of the
EPA's environmental justice analysis of three CAA rules, the EPA expressed the view that the
permitting process, rather than the rulemaking process, would best address environmental justice
concerns. Id. at 19. But as the following discussion in the text indicates, permit decisions do not
gather all the necessary information about the consequences of the proposed activities.
96 Nathaniel 0. Keohane, The Technocratic and Democratic Functions of the CAIR Regulatory
Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 73, at 33, 41 ("Air quality
improvements may disproportionately benefit low-income households, to the extent that they are
concentrated in urban areas or in places with poor initial air quality."); see also O'Neill, The Ma-
thematics of Mercury, supra note 73, at 124-25 (noting that the least advantaged may be viewed
as "net gainers" only by ignoring existing disparities in distribution and adopting the status quo as
the relevant baseline).
97 See Sheila R. Foster, Meeting the Environmental Justice Challenge: Evolving Norms in
Environmental Decisionmaking, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,992 (2000) (discussing the EAB's resolu-
tion of eight decisions between 1995 and 2000). Although the EAB has held that permitting enti-
ties have authority under federal environmental statutes, such as the CAA, the Safe Drinking
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la Foster has noted, "to the particular environmental media regulated by the sta-
tute at issue."9 For example, "an impact assessment for permits issued pursuant
to the UIC [Underground Injection Control] regulations in the SDWA [Safe
Drinking Water Act] must focus exclusively on identifying and addressing dis-
proportionate impacts to a vulnerable community's drinking water." 99 Moreo-
ver, in one of the EAB's most well-known decisions analyzing an environmen-
tal justice challenge, the EAB concluded that although the permitting region had
the authority under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") to
consider disproportionate impacts to low-income or minority communities, it
"would not have discretion to redress impacts that are unrelated or only tenuous-
ly related to human health and the environment, such as disproportionate im-
pacts on the economic well-being of a minority or low-income community."100
But, as environmental justice scholars and advocates have long empha-
sized, the direct impacts of a particular activity understood within the context of
a particular statute (e.g., in conjunction with the NAAQS under the Clean Air
Act ("CAA")) are only part of the story. Even health-based standards, such as
the NAAQS, that supposedly protect public health are not always based on ana-
lyses of many of the health risks of greatest concern to vulnerable communi-
ties-such as risks of respiratory, reproductive, and immune damage.' 0 They
also do not necessarily address localized "hot spots," areas where air pollution is
concentrated due to multiple pollution sources, because the localized pollution
may not affect the larger area measured for compliance with ambient stan-
dards. 10 2 The health effects of a given activity, such as emissions from a power
plant, will depend on the characteristics of the local population (e.g., existing
rates of respiratory illness) and the larger environment (e.g., the cumulative ef-
fects of multiple sources of pollution and the synergistic effects of multiple
Water Act ("SDWA"), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), to consider
environmental justice concerns, it has yet to reject a permit on these grounds. Id. at 10,993;
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION, supra note 28, at 258. Of course, given
the EAB's abuse-of-discretion standard of review, it is unlikely to reject a permit on grounds that
are within a permitting entity's discretion.
98 Foster, supra note 97, at 11,004.
99 Id. Foster is referring here to an EAB decision, in which the EAB held that the permitting
region had no authority to "'redress impacts unrelated to the protection of underground sources of
drinking water, such as alleged negative economic impacts on the community, diminution in
property values, or alleged proliferation of local undesirable land uses."' Id. (quoting In re Envo-
tech, L.P., 6 E.A.D. 260, 282 (EAB 1996)). Similarly, in In re Ecodlectrica, L.P., the EAB de-
clined to review a permit decision on environmental justice grounds when the permitting region
concluded that a proposed plant would not have an adverse impact because the maximum emis-
sions from the plant would be below the NAAQS. In re Ecodlectrica, L.P., 7 E.A.D. 56, 68 (EAB
1997).
100 In re Chem. Waste Mgmt. of Ind., Inc., 6 E.A.D. 66, 75 (EAB 1995).
101 Kuehn, supra note 83, at 127.
102 Foster, supra note 97, at 11,003.
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chemicals or "stressors").10 3 Moreover, a given activity might have a range of
other physical and psychological effects if the activity results in various nuis-
ances, such as odor or noise and vibrations from increased truck traffic, or if it
affects surrounding property values.' 04 These effects will also depend on how
people perceive the relevant risks, and communities will perceive and weigh
risks differently.10 Thus, to assess whether a particular environmental rule or
policy is fair, we need an approach to justice that focuses on human lives, not
just the environmental good or bad being distributed.
C. The Capabilities Perspective
Economist Amartya Sen and others have developed just such an ap-
proach, a system for evaluating social inequalities that focuses on human lives,
rather than on social goods or resources.1 06 The capability approach assesses
individuals' quality of life (i.e., their well-being) according to the opportunities,
or "capabilities," individuals have to do and be the things they have reason to
value. 107 Sen calls these states of "doing and being"-for example, being well-
103 Id. at 10,998. In South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J Dep't of Envtl. Prot., the district
court directed the permitting entity to conduct a Title VI disparate impact analysis that would
consider cumulative effects and the community's vulnerability to greater risks based on local
health data. 145 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J.), modified, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001), rev'd, 274
F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001). Unfortunately, the Third Circuit eventually reversed the district court's
order. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 791 (3d Cir.
2001). The fate of the case turned in part on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Alexander v.
Sandoval that individuals may not sue under Title VI to enforce Title VI discriminatory effect
regulations. Id. at 777-78 (discussing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)). The Third
Circuit rejected the district court's theory that the plaintiffs could nevertheless enforce the Title VI
regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id at 790-791. Whether § 1983 is a means of enforcement in
other jurisdictions remains an open question. Without the option of enforcing Title VI disparate-
impact regulations, plaintiffs have the onerous burden of proving intentional discrimination under
either Title VI or the Equal Protection Clause. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-81. Regardless of
their theory of discrimination, plaintiffs bringing environmental justice challenges in courts have
not enjoyed much success. See generally John Martinez & Michael Libonati, 3 LOCAL Gov'T LAW
§ 16.65 n.4 (2010) (noting that "suits premised on environmental justice have been almost un-
iformly unsuccessful" and listing cases); Carlton Waterhouse, Abandon All Hope Ye That Enter?
Equal Protection, Title VI, and the Divine Comedy ofEnvironmental Justice, 20 FORDHAM ENvTL.
L. REV. 51, 57-102 (2009) (discussing attempts to use civil rights laws to remedy environmental
injustice and reasons these attempts have failed).
104 Foster, supra note 97, at 11,003-04. Foster notes two EAB cases in which the permitting
region evaluated these kinds of effects, but expresses concern that this practice may remain li-
mited because permitting entities are not required to consider these impacts. Id. at 11,004.
105 Id at 11,002.
106 Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 31 (Martha C. Nuss-
baum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993) [hereinafter Sen, Capability and Well-Being].
107 Id. at 31. I should emphasize that Sen's capability approach is technically best understood as
a system of social evaluation, see, e.g., S.R. Osmani, The Sen System of Social Evaluation, in 1
ARGUMENTS FOR A BETTER WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF AMARTYA SEN 15, 15 (Kaushik Basu &
Ravi Kanbur eds., 2009), or as an "approach to justice," SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 1.
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nourished, being in good health, or taking part in the community-
"functionings."'0o The capability approach judges social advantages and disad-
vantages in terms of people's capabilities to achieve the various functionings
that they have reason to value.109 The approach has been highly influential in the
fields of human development and human rights," 0 informing the scholarship in
this area and shaping empirical measures of poverty and development, including
the indexes of human development and human poverty produced by the United
Nations Development Programme."' In addition to its many applications within
the social sciences and economics,1 12 academics have begun exploring the ap-
proach's contribution to law and policy questions in the areas of property,
health," sustainability,' 15 and corporate social responsibility." 6
Sen's capability approach provides the ideal framework for analyzing
environmental justice concerns because it can be used both to evaluate existing
policies and to develop proposals for social change. It also does not suffer from
the shortfalls of the difference principle because it is concerned with real-world
consequences and alternatives, rather than ideal institutions, and it focuses on
what people can actually do and be as a result of environmental decisions, rather
See generally Ingrid Robeyns, Justice as Fairness and the Capability Approach, in 1 ARGUMENTS
FOR A BETTER WORLD, supra, at 397, 403 (noting that the capability approach is not a theory of
justice, but is instead a "general framework for specifying a space for the interpersonal compari-
son of individual well-being, and can be developed into a wide range of capability theories").
10 Sen, Capability and Well-Being, supra note 106, at 31.
109 Id. ("Functionings represent parts of the state of a person-in particular the various things
he or she manages to do or be in leading a life. The capability of a person reflects the alternative
combinations or functionings the person can achieve, and from which he or she can choose one
collection.").
110 See, e.g., 2 ARGUMENTS FOR A BETTER WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF AMARTYA SEN 4 (Kau-
shik Basu & Ravi Kanbur eds., 2009) (collecting essays on capabilities and human development);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH
(2000) ; AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (2000)
'" See KEVIN WARKINS, THE HUMAN DEV. REPORT OFFICE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
356, 356-357 (2007/2008), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf.
112 See, e.g., 2 ARGUMENTS FOR A BETTER WORLD, supra note I10, at 4 (collecting essays from
a range of disciplines, including political science, sociology, history, and economics).
113 See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2821, 2874-78 (2006); James J. Kelly, Jr., Land Trusts That Conserve Communities, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 72, 91-96 (2009); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to
Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1258-63 (2005).
114 See, e.g., JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 45-130 (2010); Jennifer Prah
Ruger, Health, Capability, and Justice: Toward a New Paradigm of Health Ethics, Policy and
Law, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 403, 435-440 (2006).
15 See, e.g., Nancy D. Perkins, Livability, Regional Equity, and Capability: Closing in on
Sustainable Land Use, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 157, 158-160, 188-192, 195-202 (2008).
116 See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globali-
zation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 705, 710 (2002).
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than on the geographic distribution of environmental goods and bads. In the
following sections, I elaborate on these distinctions and conclude with a discus-
sion of how the capability approach best captures the vision of environmental
justice as it is articulated by both the EPA and the environmental justice move-
ment.
1. A Real-World Approach: Focusing on Human Lives
A theoretical framework for addressing environmental injustice must
begin with the world as it is, namely a world that lacks perfectly just social
structures and institutions. The relevant inquiry is whether our legal rules and
institutions promote environmental justice by addressing existing disparities,
rather than whether they simply avoid exacerbating existing inequities. Even if a
stricter environmental standard is likely to benefit everyone, it may do little to
close the gap between the least and most advantaged and it does not necessarily
guarantee an adequate level of protection for all.
By way of example, consider the way the EPA justified the total maxi-
mum daily load ("TMDL") for dioxin challenged in Dioxin/Organochlorine
Center v. Longview Fibre Co. '" After finding that levels of dioxin in the Co-
lumbia River violated state water quality standards, three states asked the EPA
to issue the required TMDL, which would establish the maximum amount of
dioxin permitted from all combined sources."' 8 The EPA determined the am-
bient concentration of dioxin that would result from the TMDL and the corres-
ponding level that would accumulate in the tissue of fish.'19 To determine the
risk to human health from consumption of the fish, the EPA used the national
average total consumption rate of 6.5 grams per day and concluded that the av-
erage risk satisfied the risk level of one in a million mandated by state water
quality standards.120 Environmental groups challenged the TMDL in part be-
cause the EPA did not consider the risk that this level of dioxin would pose to
certain subpopulations that consume greater amounts of fish-a risk estimated
to be 23 in a million. 12 Even though the EPA had "acknowledge[d] that contin-
uing scientific studies may indicate that subpopulations are not adequately pro-
tected by the TMDL," the Ninth Circuit nevertheless upheld the EPA's deci-
sion. 122 The court noted that this increased risk is "within levels historically ap-
proved by the EPA and upheld by courts" and that the EPA reasonably inter-
preted "the one-in-a-million risk level mandated by the state water quality stan-
117 Dixon/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Longview Fibre Co., 57 F.3d 1517, 1517 (9th Cir. 1995).
118 Id. at 1520.
"' Id. at 1523.
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dards for the general population" to "allow for lower yet adequate protection of
specific subpopulations."l 23
The EPA's interpretation of the state standards in this case is not one
that promotes environmental justice. Such an approach ignores actual lives, re-
lying instead on theoretical averages and an underlying policy choice that re-
quires people to adjust their behavior (i.e., eat less fish) in order to avoid higher
exposures. 124 The justness of the standard, however, cannot be judged in hypo-
thetical terms, but must instead be assessed according to the social conse-
quences that follow. As Sen emphasizes, "[w]hat really happens to people can-
not but be a central concern of a theory of justice."l 25 Furthermore, aside from
whether indigenous populations and subsistence fishers can practically consume
less fish, decreased consumption may restrict some groups from engaging in
cultural and religious traditions,126 just as asking some communities to avoid the
risks of ozone exposure on days with "ozone alerts" may restrict people's op-
portunities for outdoor recreation, community engagement, and income-
generating work.
In sum, the justice of a particular environmental rule or standard cannot
be assessed apart from people's actual lives. A capability-based approach to
environmental decision making ensures that we assess the justice of these rules
by focusing on how they restrict or enhance the opportunities people actually
have to do and be the things they have reason to value. As Sen conceptualizes it,
the capability approach is concerned not only with what people achieve ("cul-
mination outcomes"), but also with the freedom people have to determine their
lives ("comprehensive outcomes"):' 2 7 "In assessing our lives, we have reason to
be interested not only in the kind of lives we manage to lead, but also in the
freedom that we actually have to choose between different styles and ways of
living." 2 8 For example, a person who voluntarily fasts and a person who does
not eat because of famine are similarly deprived of food, but they do not enjoy
the same freedom. 129 Similarly, a person who must avoid a health risk by not
eating fish in accordance with religious or cultural traditions may enjoy less
freedom than a person who simply eats very little fish. And even if we distribute
environmental goods (e.g., cleaner water) and bads (e.g., LULUs) equally across
123 Dixon/Organochlorine Ctr., 57 F.3d at 1524.
124 See Catherine A. O'Neill, No Mud Pies: Risk Avoidance as Risk Regulation, 31 VT. L. REV.
273, 274, 344 (2007) (discussing and critiquing the increased use of risk avoidance as a regulatory
tool) [hereinafter O'Neill, Risk Avoidance].
125 SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 68.
126 O'Neill, Variable Justice, supra note 30, at 15-16, 86.
127 See SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 215-17 (discussing the distinctions between
"culmination outcomes" and "comprehensive outcomes").
128 Id. at 227; see also Osmani, supra note 107, at 29 (noting that Sen describes his approach as
consequence-sensitive or consequence-based rather than consequentialist because it incorporates
this element of choice).
129 SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 237.
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the population, we cannot assess the justice of the rules of distribution without
asking how they affect actual lives. As I explain in the next section, the capabili-
ty approach's informational focus does just that.
2. Gathering the Relevant Information: Capabilities and Function-
ings
In his well-known Tanner Lecture Equality of What?, Sen underscores
the ways in which conventional metrics used to measure social advantage,
namely utility and primary goods, fail to provide the information we need to
evaluate social inequalities.130 As discussed above, if we focus only on social
goods or resources, we fail to see what these goods do for people. Sen's oft-
cited example of someone in a wheelchair illustrates this point: provided the
person has the same resources or goods as others, the difference principle will
not give her more even if she requires more, for example, to be mobile.131 The
critique applies not simply to cases of serious deprivation, but more generally.
By focusing on the "things" to be distributed, we ignore human diversity:
If people were basically very similar, then an index of primary
goods might be quite a good way of judging advantage. But, in
fact, people seem to have very different needs varying with
health, longevity, climatic conditions, location, work condi-
tions, temperament, and even body size (affecting food and
clothing requirements). So what is involved is not merely ignor-
ing a few hard cases, but overlooking very widespread and real
differences. Judging advantage purely in terms of primary
goods leads to a partially blind morality.13 2
Indeed, as we have already seen, environmental standards and decisions often
reflect this partially blind morality by ignoring differences across populations
and focusing only on the environmental good that is being distributed.
130 Sen, Equality of What, supra note 91, at 357, 366.
131 Id. at 357, 368. As Sen explains, even though utility does focus on what goods or resources
do to people (in terms of their happiness or preference satisfaction), it fails to support the alloca-
tion of more resources to the person in a wheelchair in part because of its informational focus. Id.
The choice of an "evaluative space" (e.g., primary goods vs. capabilities) has significant conse-
quences for "the distributional patterns (including necessary inequalities) in the other spaces."
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 20-21 (1992) [hereinafter SEN, INEQUALITY
REEXAMINED].
132 Sen, Equality of What, supra note 91, at 366. The capability approach "differs from other
approaches" in "tak[ing] the sets of individual capabilities as constituting an indispensable and
central part of the relevant informational base" for assessing social inequalities. Sen, Capability
and Well-Being, supra note 106, at 30. It is "concerned with showing the cogency of a particular
space [capability] for the evaluation of individual opportunities and successes." Id. at 50.
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To understand how environmental regulations affect different communi-
ties, we therefore need to ask how they affect what people in those communities
can do and be; in other words, we must assess the impact on people's capabili-
ties and functionings (their well-being). A capability-based theoretical frame-
work for assessing environmental inequities ensures we gather the relevant in-
formation (i.e., focus on the relevant "'evaluative space"') because it directs our
attention to human difference and the ways in which "external" and "personal
characteristics" affect people's abilities to convert resources into the things they
want to do and be.13 3 In fact, Sen's discussion of human diversity in terms of
personal and external characteristics overlaps with environmental justice scho-
lars' discussion of human variation in terms of intrinsic and acquired characte-
ristics.13 4 In addition to personal, or intrinsic, characteristics, such as "age, sex,
physical and mental abilities,"1 3 5 Sen stresses the differences that arise from
external, or acquired, characteristics that can result from the "natural and social
environment in which we live."l 36 These differences profoundly affect people's
capabilities (e.g., the health capability of escaping premature mortality) and the
extent to which environmental measures restrict or enhance these capabilities.
The health impacts of an environmental measure that seeks to improve air quali-
ty will, for example, differ from community to community based on differences
in social and environmental factors. 137
It is these differences among groups and communities that are the pri-
mary focus of environmental justice, particularly as it is reflected in laws, such
as Executive Order 12,898138 and Title VI regulations. 3 9 But as Sen acknowl-
edges, capabilities are understood as "attributes of people, not of collectivities,
such as communities." 4 0 Given this focus, we might question whether the ap-
proach adequately captures the ways in which people's freedom to achieve val-
uable functionings is shaped by their communities and group identities. But as
Sen has explained, the capability approach does recognize these interdependent
133 SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED, supra note 131, at 20.
134 See supra Part II.B.2.
135 SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED, supra note 131, at 20.
136 Id at 1.
137 For example, areas of increased air pollution, often called "hot spots," can occur as a result
of air quality regulations, particularly those that rely on economic "pollution trading" programs.
See Richard T. Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed
Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 231, 235-236 (1999) (criticizing
emissions-trading programs by highlighting the ineffectiveness and injustice of emissions trading
in Los Angeles); see also Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change
Policy, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10287, 10,299-303 (2008) (discussing the implications of trading in
greenhouse-gas emissions for "hotspot" risks created by the existing regulatory system).
'3 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994), as amended by Exec. Order
No. 12,948, 60 Fed. Reg. 6381 (Feb. 1, 1995).
139 Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 601-02, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
140 SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 244.
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capabilities, that is, capabilities that derive their value from "the importance that
people attach to being able to do certain things in collaboration with others"
(e.g., being able to take part in the community or in the community's tradi-
tions). 14 1 Even though the capability approach embraces the liberal notion that
individuals are the proper subject of moral theory, it explicitly recognizes the
importance of social norms and influences and acknowledges the interrelated
nature of capabilities.. 42 1In other words, the approach recognizes the importance
of groups as "social relations" that partially constitute individuals' identities, a
perspective consistent with movement conceptions, as the following section
illustrates. 143
3. The Capability Approach Compared to Movement Conceptions
and the EPA's Approach to Environmental Justice
i. Movement Conceptions of Environmental Justice
The emphasis the capability approach places on differences arising from
social and environmental factors is one of the reasons it captures and can assess
environmental injustices. By acknowledging the influence of external characte-
ristics, including those flowing from a given social environment, the capability
approach directs our attention to how forms of structural oppression, such as
racism and class oppression, affect people's well-being, a concern at the heart of
the environmental justice movement.144 As Ingrid Robeyns has explained, this
gives the capability approach a greater informational reach than other liberal
theories: "The capability approach directs our focus to people's capability sets,
but insists that we also need to scrutinize the impact of social norms, the context
141 Id. at 246.
142 Ingrid Robeyns, The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey, 6 J. HUM. DEv. 93, 107-
10 (2005); see also Sabina Alkire, Using the Capability Approach: Prospective and Evaluative
Analyses, in THE CAPABILITY APPROACH: CONCEPTS, MEASURES AND APPLICATIONS 26, 38-41
(Flavio Comim et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the literature that critiques the capability approach on
the ground that it fails to recognize the intrinsic importance of group or collective capabilities and
concluding that the debate is essentially one regarding terminology: "the outstanding question is
what to call capabilities that i) a person herself values but ii) could not enjoy alone.").
13 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 44 (Frank Hunt ed.,
1990). ("Social groups are not entities that exist apart from individuals, but neither are they mere-
ly arbitrary classifications of individuals according to attributes which are external to or accidental
to their identities . ... Group meanings partially constitute people's identities in terms of the cul-
tural forms, social situation, and history that group members know as theirs, because these mean-
ings have been either forced upon them or forged by them or both. Groups are real not as sub-
stances, but as forms of social relations.").
144 Structural oppression refers to "systematic" oppression that does not necessarily result from
intentional choices or policies, but exists in social and economic norms and institutions. See id at
41 (explaining that the causes of structural oppression are "embedded in unquestioned norms,
habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective conse-
quences of following those rules").
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in which economic production and social interactions take place and how that
affects people's well-being . . . ."145 Similarly, the environmental justice move-
ment has called attention to the ways in which environmental injustices are con-
nected to other social injustices as a result of social, political, and economic
forces.
In his taxonomy of environmental justice, Robert Kuehn categorizes
this aspect of environmental justice as a demand for social justice.146 As Kuehn
observes, movement participants understand various deprivations as interre-
lated: "As one community organizer explained, oppressed people do not have
compartmentalized problems-they do not separate the hazardous waste incine-
rator from the facts that their schools are underfunded, that they have no day
care, no sidewalks or streetlights, or no jobs." 47 Similarly, the seventeen prin-
ciples adopted in 1991 at the First National People of Color Environmental Lea-
dership Summit clearly reflect an understanding of environmental injustice as
one deprivation linked to many others.148 The summit, according to Robert Bul-
lard, "broadened the movement beyond its early focus against toxics to include
issues of public health, worker safety, land use, transportation, housing, resource
allocation, and community empowerment." 49 Indeed, both activists and scho-
lars have moved away from the phrase "environmental equity" in favor of "en-
vironmental justice" precisely because justice is understood to capture the un-
derlying social and economic context, not simply the unequal distribution of
environmental goods and bads.'"o
Given the movement's focus on issues of race and class, David Schlos-
berg has questioned why academic attempts to theorize environmental justice do
not adequately address how social conditions, particularly the lack of recogni-
tion at the individual and group level, produce social inequalities.' He notes
145 Robeyns, Justice as Fairness and the Capability Approach, supra note 107, at 405.
146 Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,681, 10,698
(2000).
147 Id. at 10,699 (citing JONATHAN F. KING, A Place at the Table, SIERRA, May/June 1993, at
51, 58.
148 See UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, ALMOST EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNow ABOUT
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, 10-11, available at
http://www.ucc.org/justice/advocacyresources/pdfs/environmental-justice/almost-everything-
you-need-to-know-about-environmental-justice-english-version.pdf (quoting the seventeen prin-
ciples). For example, the principles affirm the right to work in a healthy environment without
sacrificing employment prospects and the need to rebuild urban and rural areas while ensuring
"fair access for all to the full range of resources." Id.
149 Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice in the Twenty-First Century, in THE QUEST FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 19-20.
Iso SCHLOSBERG, supra note 23, at 58 ("The term justice replaced equity in the literature of the
movement because those involved in, and reflecting on, the movement understood justice as a
more inclusive term that incorporated equity and much more.").
151 Id. at 58-64. In addition to issues of recognition, Schlosberg's study illuminates how
movement groups articulate environmental justice in plural terms, emphasizing the importance of
equal distribution, recognition, participation, and capabilities. He emphasizes that "at the very
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that "[t]he central concern of many environmental justice groups is community
and cultural survival in a system where recognition is denied and communities
and cultures are thoroughly devalued."l 5 2 This devaluation often takes the form
of indifference to culture, particularly the culture of indigenous populations.1'
For example, the use of aquifer water to slurry coal from Black Mesa mines
negatively affects springs that the Navajo and Hopi peoples use for both agricul-
tural purposes and religious ceremonies; in addition to restricting agricultural
uses of water, this practice clearly fails to recognize the importance of living a
life in accordance with one's religious, spiritual, and cultural beliefs.15 4
The capability approach explicitly recognizes these cultural impacts as
part of the information relevant to assessing a particular policy or practice be-
cause the capabilities of taking part in religious and cultural traditions and of
being free to live a life in accordance with one's moral and religious beliefs are
capabilities people have reason to value. To assess the justice of a particular
practice, we therefore need to know more than how much water these Navajo
and Hopi communities have (the distributive approach); we need to know what
these communities can do with the water (the capability approach). If a policy
regarding water use results in a serious deprivation of cultural and religious ca-
pabilities, that information is vital to any decision-making process that claims to
take environmental justice concerns into consideration.
Furthermore, the prospective use of the capability approach, which is
explained in more depth below,"5s provides an opportunity to address issues of
recognition because it can help policymakers investigate how social and eco-
nomic forces contribute to deprivations relevant to environmental policies. 5 6
For example, disasters, such as those precipitated by Hurricane Katrina and the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, have devastating effects on minority and low-
income populations, restricting a range of capabilities ranging from being
healthy to being well-sheltered and moving about freely.'57 Once key capability
deprivations have been identified, the approach directs attention to the questions
least, it should be clear that environmental justice means much more than a lack of equity in the
distribution of environmental ills." Id. at 75.
152 Id. at 62.
1s3 Id at 63.
154 Id. at 64 (citing VALERIE KULETZ, THE TAINTED DESERT: ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL RUIN
IN THE AMERICAN WEST 205-44 (1998)).
15s See infra Part IV.A.
156 Sabina Alkire discusses an example of a "prospective analysis" grounded in the capability
approach: a study of development and education in India. Alkire, supra note 142, at 43-45. After
identifying education as valuable in itself and as an instrumental means of advancing other capa-
bilities, the study investigates the deprivations in education and its potential causes. Id Next,
"[h]aving diagnosed, as it were, core issues, the analysis turns to actions that people ... could
undertake as agents in order to redress the situation." Id. at 45.
157 See, e.g., ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A
POST-KATRINA WORLD 136-42 (2010).
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of how and why these communities suffer such severe deprivations in order to
propose policies that seek to prevent, lessen, or remedy them.
In his recent study of disaster law and policy, Robert Verchick asks
such questions by investigating the ways in which race and class contribute to
social vulnerabilities in areas such as housing, transportation, and urban devel-
opment that cause some communities to suffer greater risk exposure and in-
jury."' For example, after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, lack of per-
sonal transportation resulted in the permanent displacement of "[h]undreds of
thousands of people, many of them poor and African American."l 59 As Verchick
explains, the evacuation plan assumed that people would be able to drive out of
New Orleans in their cars, but many of New Orleans's poor households did not
have cars: "21,787 of these households without a car were black," while only
"2,606 were white."1 6 0 By examining the underlying causes for such severe de-
privations in capabilities, policymakers can recommend more effective poli-
cies-for example, an evacuation strategy that protects all communities.
ii. The EPA's Approach to Environmental Justice
The capability approach also resonates with the EPA's emerging ap-
proach to environmental justice. The capability approach's informational focus
could be easily integrated into the EPA's most recent guidance (Interim EJ
Guidance) regarding the integration of environmental justice into the develop-
ment process for Agency actions, broadly defined to "include rules, policy
statements, risk assessments, guidance documents, models that may be used in
future rulemakings and strategies that are related to regulations."161 The Interim
EJ Guidance emphasizes the need to consider environmental justice concerns in
deciding whether to pursue an action and indentifies the opportunities for incor-
poration of these concerns at various stages in the development of an action,
including the information-gathering phase and the development of regulatory
options. 162 A focus on capabilities at these stages would ensure the Agency
identifies deprivations that the distributive focus on environmental goods and
bads may miss (for example, the way existing laws and policies restrict individ-
uals' capabilities to practice cultural and religious beliefs). 163
158 Id
159 Id. at 136.
160 Id.
161 EPA, INTERIM EJ GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 1.
162 Id. at 20, 27-29.
163 Although the Interim EJ Guidance encourages the collection of data regarding the potential
impacts on minority, low-income, and indigenous populations (a commendable step forward), it
describes the overarching goal as the evaluation of the distribution of environmental burdens and
benefits, an approach that does not guarantee decision makers gather information about the vari-
ous ways benefits and burdens actually enhance or limit people's lives. See id. at 3 (explaining
80 [Vol. 114
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Although the Interim EJ Guidance speaks in terms of the distribution of
goods and bads, rather than capabilities, aspects of its approach implicitly ac-
knowledge the importance of capabilities, particularly health capabilities, in
assessing the distributive consequences of environmental policies. The guidance
contains a list of six factors, developed by the EPA's Office of Environmental
Justice, to assist rulemakers in identifying existing and potential disproportio-
nate impacts. 16 In addition to a community's proximity to environmental ha-
zards, such as industrial plants, the guidance recognizes that intrinsic and ac-
quired characteristics can increase a population's susceptibility, noting for ex-
ample that "[m]inority, low-income, and indigenous children are at greater risk
because factors such as poverty, poor nutrition, pre-existing health conditions,
lack of access to health care, lack of information, lack of exercise, psychosocial
stress, and lack of social capital contribute to greater susceptibility to environ-
mental hazards."l65 It also acknowledges that "unique exposure pathways" (e.g.,
cultural practices that increase fish consumption) can increase a population's
exposure to hazards and that some communities experience cumulative effects
from multiple sources of pollution, directing attention to the EPA's Framework
for Cumulative Risk Assessment.1 6 6 The final factors relevant to assessing dis-
proportionate impacts are the population's "ability, or inability, to participate in
the environmental decision-making process" and "[p]hysical infrastructure,"
such as housing conditions. 167
All these factors reflect an emerging recognition that environmental jus-
tice requires a multidimensional approach that measures inequalities based on
the quality of people's lives (on what they can do and be), rather than on what
people have (the distribution of environmental goods and bads). The conse-
quences of environmental policies-the impacts on different communities-are
a product of the larger social and natural environment in which people live. By
recognizing the importance of a broader informational base that considers this
larger environment and its cumulative effects, the guidance is evidence that the
EPA is moving toward an approach that understands disproportionate impacts in
terms of how they affect people's well-being, an approach that identifies
people's capabilities as the relevant evaluative space.16 8 But although the guid-
ance is a useful tool for identifying and integrating environmental justice con-
that "fair treatment" requires the consideration of how "burdens" and "benefits" are distributed
across populations).
' Id. at 7-9; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACTORS FOR IDENTIFYING AND ASSESSING
DISPROPORTIONATE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH IMPACTS (2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ncer/events/calendar/2010/marl7/whitepaper.pdf (setting out the same six
factors in more detail and providing examples).
165 EPA, INTERIM EJ GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 7.
166 Id. at 8.
167 Id. at 8-9.
168 The EPA's recent environmental justice analysis of the 2008 DSW rule is further evidence
that the Agency is moving in this direction. See infra note 263, at 64,668.
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cerns into the rulemaking process, it does not tell policymakers how to assess
existing inequalities. 169 Furthermore, the capability approach, as an information-
al perspective for assessing social inequalities, does not-without further speci-
fication-tell us how to evaluate these inequalities. For this, we need to specify
the relevant capabilities and adopt a normative rule for how capabilities should
be distributed in society.
III. THE CAPABILITY APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: IDENTIFYING
CAPABILITY IMPACTS AND EVALUATING INEQUALITIES
The capability approach, as Sen develops it, is "radically underspeci-
fled' in that it does not provide a list of relevant capabilities or a means by
which to evaluate them.170 Indeed, even though inequalities are judged by refer-
ence to capabilities, the approach itself does not mandate that society choose
policies that equalize everyone's capabilities regardless of the costs and conse-
quences; in other words, it does not resolve tensions between aggregative and
distributive concerns, even though it does draw our attention to disparities in
social advantage. 171 For Sen, this is a virtue of the approach. It can be applied in
different ways "depending on the nature of the questions that are being ad-
dressed (for example, policies dealing respectively with poverty, or disability, or
cultural freedom) and, more practically, on the availability of data and of infor-
mative material that can be used."l 72 In addition to questions of application and
data, the specification of the relevant capabilities and the rules for evaluating
them involves normative choices.17 3 In this section, I further develop a capabili-
ty approach to environmental justice by proposing ways in which to identify,
weigh, and measure the relevant capabilities and by adopting a distributive rule
that evaluates inequalities relative to an established threshold. The focus of both
policy design and policy evaluation should be on the negative and positive im-
pacts to people's lives or, in capability terms, on the potential restriction and
enhancement of people's capabilities.
169 See EPA, INTERIM EJ GUIDANCE, supra, note 13, at 6 (acknowledging that "this Guide does
not provide you with guidance on how to evaluate potential EJ [environmental justice] concerns").
170 Ingrid Robeyns, The Capability Approach in Practice, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 351, 353 (2006)
[hereinafter Robeyns, Capability Approach in Practice]; see also Thomas Pogge, Can the Capa-
bility Approach Be Justified?, 30 PHIL. ToPics 167 (2002) (arguing that the capability approach
fails to specify a workable criterion that can be used to assess the relative justice of different so-
cial institutions).
"7 See SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 232-33.
172 Id.
" Robeyns, Capability Approach in Practice, supra note 170, at 353.
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A. Identifying Capability Impacts: The Role ofPublic Deliberation
Aside from acknowledging the centrality of some "basic capabilities,"
such as being well-nourished, being clothed and sheltered, and being able to
move about freely, Sen's capability approach does not commit itself to a specif-
ic list or ranking of capabilities.174 Other scholars have, however, identified the
capabilities central to particular theories of political and social justice. Martha
Nussbaum's well-known list of the "central human capabilities" required for a
life worthy of human dignity is one example. 75 Elizabeth Anderson has also
specified a list based on a principle of democratic equality.' 76 Of course, all ef-
forts to specify a list involve normative commitments: in Nussbaum's case,
these commitments draw from Aristotelian conceptions of human dignity, 77 and
in Anderson's case, these commitments are grounded in the equality required
for democratic citizenship. 78
The capability approach applied to environmental justice also involves
normative commitments, namely a commitment to addressing inequalities re-
sulting from the unfair distribution of environmental benefits and burdens. But
the process of specifying a list consistent with this principle is less ambitious in
scope than Nussbaum's or Anderson's projects because we need not identify the
universe of capabilities essential to social justice, but instead may focus on ge-
nerating a list of those most salient to environmental law and policy. Moreover,
the "most salient" capabilities are likely to change depending on the use of the
approach (generating policy vs. evaluating policy options); the particular pollu-
tant, practice, or process in question; and the data available to assess capability
174 See Sen, Equality of What, supra note 91, at 367; see also Sen, Capability and Well-Being,
supra note 106, at 40-42 (explaining that, given the moral importance of fulfilling "basic needs,"
a focus on "equality in the fulfillment of certain 'basic capabilities"' may be "an especially plaus-
ible approach to egalitarianism in the presence of elementary deprivation," but that the capability
approach can be used to analyze more than basic capabilities).
17 NUSSBAUM, supra note 91, at 76-78. The central capabilities are organized around ten di-
mensions: life (e.g., avoiding premature death); bodily health (e.g., "being able to have good
health"); bodily integrity (e.g., being able to move about freely); senses, imagination, and thought
(e.g., being literate); emotions (being able "to love" and "grieve"); practical reason (e.g., "being
able to form a conception of the good in life"); affiliation (e.g., being able to engage in forms of
"social interaction"); other species ("Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals,
plants, and the world of nature."); play ("Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activi-
ties."); control over one's environment both political and material (e.g., being able to participate in
political decision making and "being able to hold property"). Id.
176 Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 316-321(1999); see
also Elizabeth Anderson, Justifying the Capabilities Approach to Justice, in MEASURING JUSTICE:
PRIMARY GOODS AND CAPABILITIES 81, 83 (Harry Brighouse & Ingrid Robeyns eds., 2010) ("De-
mocratically relevant functionings include adequate safety, health and nutrition, education, mo-
bility and communication, the ability to interact with others without stigma, and to participate in
the system of cooperation.") [hereinafter Anderson, Justifying the Capabilities Approach].
177 NUSSBAUM, supra note 91, at 70, 159-60.
17 Anderson, Justifying the Capabilities Approach, supra note 176, at 83.
2011] 83
35
Roesler: Addressing Environmental Injustices: A Capability Approach to Rul
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
impacts. Regardless of the use, however, both theorists of the capability ap-
proach and scholars of environmental law and justice agree that public participa-
tion is an essential part of the process.179 The identification of relevant capabili-
ties therefore requires public involvement.
As noted above, consistent with Executive Order 12,898, the EPA's de-
finition of environmental justice explicitly incorporates this commitment to pub-
lic participation with an emphasis on "meaningful involvement."180 The Agency
has made admirable progress in this direction, for example, in its promotion of
collaborative problem solving at the local level'81 and its recent environmental
justice analysis of the DSW rule. 18 2 Moreover, the EPA's Interim EJ Guidance
for considering environmental justice concerns underscores the potential inade-
quacy of minimum notice and comment requirements, explaining that "mea-
ningful involvement" may require "special efforts to connect with populations
that have been historically underrepresented in decision making and that have a
wide range of educational levels, literacy, or proficiency in English."1 83 The
guidance also encourages public participation early in the process to ensure
identification of all relevant issues and establishes basic guidelines and issues
for consideration. 8 4
179 For discussions of public participation in environmental decision making, see GRAHAM
SMITH, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 54-76 (2003) (drawing on deliberative
democratic theory to explore how plural environmental values can be incorporated into political
decision making); Walter F. Baber & Robert V. Bartlett, Problematic Participants in Deliberative
Democracy: Experts, Social Movements, and Environmental Justice, 20 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 5, 6,
8-16 (2007) (examining the role of experts and social movements in deliberative democratic
processes); Bunyan Bryant, Pollution Prevention and Participatory Research as a Methodology
for Environmental Justice, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589 (1995) (advocating community participation in
researching environmental problems); Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public
Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 5, 31-57 (1998) (arguing that
administrative decision making does not effectively include participation by environmental justice
communities and proposing a new model for public participation); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Get-
ting to "Let's Talk": Comments on Collaborative Environmental Dispute Resolution Processes, 8
NEV. L.J. 835, 835-851 (2008) (responding to arguments regarding collaborative problem solving
in Bradley Karkkainen, Getting to "Let's Talk": Legal and Natural Destabilizations and the Fu-
ture of Regional Collaboration, 8 NEV. L.J. 811 (2008)); Wendy Wagner et al., Industry Domin-
ance in Publicly Important Rulemakings: An Empirical Study of EPA's Hazardous Air Pollutant
Rules, - ADMIN. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://works.bepress.com/wendy-wagner/3/ (finding imbalances in interest-group participation
between industry and environmental groups in the EPA's rulemaking process);
1so See EPA, DRAFT EJ METHODOLOGY, supra note 10, at 1.
181 See EPA's ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COLLABORATIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING MODEL, supra
note 3, at 1.
182 Definition of Solid Waste, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,094-01, 44,103-44,108 (July 22, 2011).
183 EPA, INTERIM EJ GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 13.
'8 Id. at 13-14. Several years ago, the EPA also issued a guidance on incorporating environ-
mental justice into its processes and analyses under the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2006). U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR
INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN EPA's NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSES §
1.0 (1998), available at
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The meaningful involvement of citizens is also a necessary (and some-
times sufficient) element of myriad theories of democratic justice,' and theo-
ries based on the capability approach are no exception. In Sen's formulation of
the capability approach, public deliberation is a crucial means of gathering the
information we need to identify and assess social inequalities:
[S]ocial evaluation may be starved of useful information and
good arguments if they are entirely based on separated and se-
questered cogitation. Public discussion and deliberation can
lead to a better understanding of the role, reach and significance
of particular functionings and their combinations. 18 6
He gives the example of public dialogue regarding gender-based inequalities in
India, where the growing involvement of women in public political life and dis-
cussion has led to a better understanding of important capabilities, such as the
freedom to deviate from family roles that restrict social and economic opportun-
ities.
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/policy/ejguidance-nepaepa0498.pdf. The
guidance contains recommendations for increasing the public participation of minority and low-
income communities. Id. § 4. NEPA's requirements that agencies consider alternatives to a pro-
posed action, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C), as well as NEPA regulations requiring that agencies consider
the cumulative effects (including the social and cultural impacts) of proposed actions, 40 C.F.R. §
1508.8, make the NEPA process a promising avenue for the consideration of environmental jus-
tice. Environmental rulemaking by the EPA is, however, largely exempt from NEPA requirements
either as a result of express statutory exemptions or under the court-made doctrine of functional
equivalence, which provides for an exemption if the relevant statute and regulations provide a
process, including public-participation procedures, that is functionally equivalent to NEPA's
process:
The Agency is exempted by statute for actions taken under the Clean Air Act
and for most Clean Water Act programs. The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), requires EPA to
comply only with the substantive, not the procedural, requirements of other
environmental laws for on-site responses. In the case of other EPA programs,
the courts have found EPA procedures to be "functionally equivalent" to the
NEPA process and therefore these EPA programs are exempt from NEPA
procedural requirements.
Id. § 1.2.1; see also Envtl. Prot. Agency, Notice of Policy and Procedures for Voluntary Prepara-
tion of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Documents, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,045-02, 58,045-
58,046 (Oct. 29, 1998) (noting when the EPA is required to comply with NEPA); Uma Outka,
NEPA and Environmental Justice: Integration, Implementation, and Judicial Review, 33 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 601, 610-14 (2006) (discussing NEPA's federal action requirement and the
EPA's statutory and judicial exemptions).
185 Deliberative democratic theory is, for example, centrally concerned with the principles and
processes of public reasoning about political issues. See, e.g., AMy GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996).
186 SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 242.
187 Id. at 242, 350-51.
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Although Sen does not detail how public deliberation could or should be
used to identify relevant capabilities, other scholars have outlined possible pro-
cedures. For example, Sabina Alkire has used a practical reasoning method to
evaluate three Oxfam development projects in Pakistan.188 To help guide the
participatory process for identifying valuable capabilities, facilitators used a set
of general dimensions that reflect the most basic reasons for human action.
These dimensions include life, health, and security; knowledge; work and play;
relationships; spirituality; religion; inner peace; and empowerment. 190 Devel-
oped by others through a process of practical reasoning, these general reasons
for acting arguably apply across cultures and do not incorporate normative con-
tent in the way, for example, Nussbaum's more detailed capability list does.' 9'
As Alkire details, the general dimensions helped guide an iterative process in
which local communities identified the expansion and contraction of capabilities
by discussing the positive and negative impacts of different development
projects.
Environmental rulemakers could facilitate a similar process to identify
the capability impacts of environmental policies. Rulemakers would begin by
identifying known and potential capability impacts to minority and low-income
populations. Impacts to basic capabilities related to health, such as being able to
live a normal life span and being able to live a life free from avoidable disease,
are likely to top the list, but impacts to a range of other capabilities, such as be-
ing educated, living free from poverty, and being able to move about freely,
may also make the list in part because basic health-related capabilities are in-
strumental to these and so many other capabilities.19 3 The next step is to engage
communities in a discussion of what individuals perceive to be the positive and
negative impacts of a given environmental hazard (e.g., a pollution source), us-
ing Alkire's general dimensions to guide deliberation and ensure all capability
188 SABINA ALKIRE, VALUING FREEDOMS: SEN'S CAPABILITY APPROACH AND POVERTY
REDUCTION 43-59 (2002).
189 Id. at 47-48.
190 Id. at 250-51. "Empowerment" means "an increase in autonomy." Id. at 200 n.4. In the
environmental justice context, examples of capability impacts in this dimension might be impacts
to political freedoms, such as the capability to (meaningfully) participate in environmental deci-
sion making at all political levels and the capability to express one's views regarding environmen-
tal policies and decisions.
191 Id. at 49, 54-56. I would add that framing the discussion in this way also tracks the way the
capability approach has been applied to assess levels of human development.
192 Id. at 225; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 91, at 76-78. Nussbaum's list also identifies
general dimensions (e.g., life, health, emotions) and could be used in a similar fashion without
adopting her specification of the central capabilities within these different dimensions. Id
193 Consider, for example, a young girl with asthma who lives in a neighborhood with multiple
sources of air pollution. She is likely to miss more school days and her ability to play outdoors
will be restricted as a result of health complications. SARAH BURD-SHARPS ET AL., THE MEASURE
OF AMERICA: AMERICAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008-2009 67 (2008) [hereinafter THE
MEASURE OF AMERICA].
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impacts are identified. 19 4 The same process could identify the ways in which the
presence or absence of environmental benefits, such as parks and public trans-
portation systems, affect people's lives. This ensures the identification of poten-
tial capability impacts overlooked by rulemakers, including impacts to nonma-
terial capabilities, such as taking part in one's social and political community.' 95
In sum, relevant capability impacts could be identified and refined in
stages. Agency rulemakers should begin with a preliminary list of known and
potential impacts in developing an action and refine the list by continuing the
iterative process with relevant communities at different stages of rulemaking as
more information is available and policy options are developed. During the
rulemaking process, public input therefore complements other methods, such as
empirical health studies, for gathering information about relevant impacts to
human lives.196 The objective would be to refine the more general list of capa-
bility impacts over time to identify the most serious and important impacts rele-
vant to the problem under consideration. 19'
Separating the key impacts from the trivial ones also requires public de-
liberation.198 Again, in some cases, impacts to basic capabilities related to health
(e.g., being able to live a normal lifespan) are clear priorities. But the relative
importance of, for example, economic and health capabilities may not be appar-
ent without community input. Again Alkire's study provides an example of how
public involvement might proceed. Two methods were used.199 In one method,
after grouping the capability impacts according to various dimensions (e.g.,
health, work, relationships), facilitators asked participants to rank the groups
194 As Alkire notes, the accuracy and success of this participatory process turns in large degree
on the skills of facilitators. See ALKIRE, supra note 188, at 225, 232. But as the EPA has already
recognized, approaches other than standard notice and comment procedures may be necessary to
ensure the meaningful involvement of certain populations.
195 As Alkire explains, unstructured public discussions may leave out important capabilities; a
set of dimensions ensures a comprehensive discussion "by providing 'an assemblage of reminders
of the range of possibly worthwhile activities and orientations open to [a community]."' Id. at 224
(quoting JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 81 (1980)).
196 Alkire notes that community involvement in specifying and weighting human impacts was
part of a larger assessment process that used other tools to gain relevant information. Id. at 224.
Indeed, individuals will not have all the relevant information necessary to identify impacts; public
participation is a necessary, but not a sufficient, step in identifying capability impacts. See SEN,
IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 284-86 (noting that an individual's perceptions of his or her
health may be limited by knowledge and social experience).
19 See Robeyns, Capability Approach in Practice, supra note 170, at 356 (advocating that
capabilities be specified at "different levels of generality (if a selection aims at an empirical appli-
cation or is intended to lead to implementable policy proposals, then the list should be drawn up in
at least two stages, whereby each stage will generate a list at a different level, ranging from the
level of ideal theory to more pragmatic lists").
198 See SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 242 (explaining the importance of public rea-
soning in choosing and weighing capabilities).
199 ALKIRE, supra note 188, at 225.
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from the strongest to the weakest. 200 In the other method, each participant was
asked to identify the "top three" groups of impacts. 20 1 Both methods resulted in
partial rankings. In the first approach, some impacts received equal weight,
while others could not be ranked because participants could not reach a consen-
sus. 202
Partial ranking may at first appear a weakness, but it is actually a
strength of the capability approach. Because the approach focuses on real-world
comparisons, complete agreement is often unnecessary. Partial orderings can
still help us choose among actual policy options, as Sen emphasizes with vari-
ous examples: "[T]o show that slavery severely reduces the freedom of the
slaves, or that the absence of any guarantee of medical attention -curtails our
substantive opportunities of living, or that severe undernourishment of children .
is detrimental to justice, we do not need a unique set of weights on the differ-
ent dimensions involved. ... 203 Similarly, if air pollution severely limits some
children's health, as well as their educational and social opportunities, we may
not need a complete ordering of capabilities to determine that these impacts
warrant action or to choose among different environmental standards. Moreover,
even if public deliberation does not result in a complete ordering, participants
will identify some capability impacts as more pressing than others, allowing us
to assign priority to some over others.204
Another possibility is to identify the most serious capability impacts and
give them priority and equal weighting. The Human Development Index follows
this system in assigning equal weight to three functionings: educational
201
achievement, life expectancy, and economic standard of living. Other capa-
bilities might receive less or no weight. For example, impacts to basic health-
related capabilities, such as being free from premature death and being free from
avoidable disease, could receive equal weighting, while less weight might be
assigned to other capabilities, such as educational and social capabilities, which
depend upon the enhancement of basic health-related capabilities.206
200 Id at 226.
201 Id at 227.
202 Id at 226-27. Robeyns notes that in "larger scale policy contexts, discussion of the relative
weights is the substance of political debates," implying perhaps less public participation than is
possible for "small-scale projects or evaluations," such as those in Alkire's study. Robeyns, Ca-
pability Approach in Practice, supra note 170, at 358. But the EPA is already committed to and
engaged in dialogue with vulnerable populations and could easily incorporate capability discus-
sions into current activities. Robeyns also notes the possibility of soliciting information on
weights through questionnaires, a method not yet used, but worth further consideration. Id
203 SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 243.
204 See SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED, supra note 131, at 46 (explaining that without specify-
ing weights, a "'dominance partial order' results from the specifying of valuable capabilities and
functionings and this reflects agreement that "[h]aving more of each relevant functioning or capa-
bility is a clear improvement").
205 UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 111, at 356.
206 See RUGER, supra note 114, at 76.
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B. Evaluating Inequalities: Choosing Indicators and a Distributive Rule
Once the relevant capability impacts are identified, the next set of ques-
tions involves measurement and evaluation. Rather than proposing one specific
methodology, my intent in this section is to highlight some of the key questions
researchers and policymakers should consider and to identify issues of particular
concern from an environmental justice perspective. An analysis of the various
ways in which the capability approach has been operationalized is beyond the
scope of this article.
The first question in measuring capabilities is whether to focus on capa-
bilities (well-being freedom) or functionings (well-being achievement).20 7 From
a policy standpoint, capabilities are the ideal metric because they focus on the
opportunities people have to be and do the things they have reason to value,
thereby acknowledging the importance of choice and process. For example, if a
person chooses to fast and therefore not achieve the basic capability of being
well-nourished, this should have little bearing on public welfare policies, whe-
reas public policies should address people's inability to be well-nourished when
people have no choice.208 In short, public policy should be concerned with indi-
viduals' freedom to achieve the outcomes they have reason to value, rather than
with whether they actually achieve them.209
But although capabilities are the theoretical focus, applications of the
capability approach, especially large-scale quantitative applications, tend to
measure capabilities in terms of particular functionings.210 Indeed, capabilities
207 In addition to well-being freedom and well-being achievement, Sen's approach includes
agency freedom and agency achievement as possible spaces in which to evaluate and compare
individuals' advantages. See Sen, Capability and Well-Being, supra note 106, at 35. Agency in-
volves the pursuit of goals an individual has reason to endorse, but these goals may or may not
advance that individual's well-being. Id. I do not discuss agency freedom and achievement be-
cause, as Sen points out, deprivations relevant to policymaking are arguably those to a person's
well-being: for example, "the state may have better grounds for offering support to a person for
overcoming hunger or illness than for helping him to build a monument to his hero, even if he
himself attaches more importance to the monument than to the removal of his hunger or illness."
Id. at 36.
208 See id. ("[F]or adult citizens, well-being freedom may be more relevant to state policy ...
than well-being achievement (e.g., the state may have reason to offer a person adequate opportuni-
ties to overcome hunger, but not to insist that he must take up that offer and cease to be hun-
gry).").
209 See Ruger, Health, Capability, and Justice: Toward a New Paradigm of Health Ethics,
Policy and Law, supra note 114, at 136-37.
210 Robeyns, Capability Approach in Practice, supra note 170, at 359 (noting that "applications
have focussed on functionings rather than capabilities" and research that measures capabilities is
in the early stages). In Sen's approach, a person's overall freedom is measured by that person's
"capability set," which is made up of the different combinations of functionings (the set of "func-
tioning n tuples") from which a person may choose: "In the space of functionings, any point
represents an n tuple of functionings. Capability is a set of such functioning n tuples, representing
the various alternative combinations of functionings from which the person can choose one com-
bination." SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED, supra note 131, at 50.
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are defined derivatively from functionings. The capability to move about freely,
for example, is the freedom to achieve the functioning of moving about freely.
Functionings may, therefore, serve as proxies for capabilities, but they obvious-
ly will fail to measure the opportunity, or freedom, aspect of capabilities. For
this reason, researchers have also attempted to measure capabilities directly.
Small-scale qualitative studies, such as Alkire's, are able to measure capabili-
ties, although the results may not apply in other contexts. And to measure capa-
bilities on a large scale, researchers have used surveys with questions that dis-
tinguish achievements (functionings) from opportunities (capabilities). 2 11
Whatever the approach, research regarding capabilities and functionings
measures chosen indicators, or variables, of a given capability or functioning.
For example, the Human Development Index measures the functioning of edu-
cational achievement by measuring adult literacy and school enrollment.2 12
Often, researchers use available data sets to measure well-being in terms of
functionings. Researchers have, for example, measured well-being using the
Bank of Italy's Survey of Household Income and Wealth, which contains data
from several dimensions, such as health, education, housing, and relation-
ships.213
Once the data are gathered and policymakers have information about re-
levant capabilities, they will need to adopt a distributive rule in order to evaluate
differences in capabilities and identify the differences that demand the most
attention. As Elizabeth Anderson has explained, the evaluation of the justness of
different levels of capabilities requires a distributive rule: "Theories of distribu-
tive justice must specify two things: a metric and a rule. The metric characteriz-
es the type of good subject to demands of distributive justice. The rule specifies
how that good should be distributed."2 14 She argues that capability theorists
agree on the metric (capabilities or functionings).215 They also agree that the
distributive rule should be distribution sensitive (i.e., it should specify the ap-
propriate pattern of distribution in society).2 16 But to specify the pattern of dis-
tribution, theorists must adopt a normative principle of equality. 2 17 Theories of
social justice tend to adopt one of three approaches: society must guarantee
equal opportunities or holdings (an equalitarian rule), society must give priority
to the relative gains and losses of the least advantaged (a prioritarian rule), or
society must guarantee all individuals a designated minimum threshold (a suffi-
211 See, e.g., Paul Anand et al., The Measurement of Capabilities, in 1 ARGUMENTS FOR A
BETTER WORLD, supra note 107, at 283, 286-87. For example, one question designed to measure
health-related capabilities was: "Does your health in any way limit your daily activities compared
to most people of your age?" Id. at 304.
212 UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 111, at 356.
213 Robeyns, Capability Approach in Practice, supra note 170, at 365.
214 Anderson, Justifying the Capabilities Approach, supra note 176, at 81.





West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 114, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol114/iss1/5
ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICES
cientarian rule).218 Like Nussbaum's approach, Anderson's distributive rule is
sufficientarian: citizens are entitled to "a capability set sufficient to enable them
to function as equals in society." 2 19
From the perspective of environmental justice, an equalitarian rule de-
manding equality of capabilities makes little sense because it does not identify
the optimal level of relevant functionings (thereby limiting society's obligation
to ensure adequate standards) or permit inequalities based on other moral con-
siderations, such as fairness and merit.22 0 A prioritarian rule (e.g., Rawls's dif-
ference principle) would direct the focus to the least advantaged in terms of re-
levant capabilities, which is clearly a concern of environmental justice. It does
not, however, establish clear goals; in choosing among policy options, it directs
us to choose the option that most improves the situation of the least advantaged,
but it does not allow us to judge whether we are doing enough. For this, we need
a sufficientarian rule that specifies thresholds to which all individuals are en-
titled.
An approach that best meets the demands of environmental justice
would adopt a hybrid rule, one that is both sufficientarian in mandating that
environmental hazards and risks do not prevent people from attaining a desig-
nated threshold and prioritarian in allocating resources to address the environ-
mental problems that do, in fact, keep some individuals from attaining the thre-
shold. Jennifer Ruger's capability approach to health is an example of an ap-
proach with a hybrid distributive rule.22 1 Ruger advocates shortfall equality as
the standard by which to design and assess health policies. In contrast to "at-
tainment equality," which judges social advantage by comparing individuals'
absolute levels of achievement, "shortfall equality" compares "shortfalls of ac-
tual achievement from the optimal average (such as longevity or physical per-
formance)." 222 In Ruger's approach, the goal of health policy is the reduction of
shortfall inequalities in two central health capabilities: being able to avoid pre-
mature mortality and being able to avoid escapable morbidity. 22 3 The objective
is to reduce the gap between individuals' actual and maximal health functioning
given their natural circumstances, a condition that recognizes human diversity
218 Id.; see also RUGER, supra note 113, at 88.
219 Anderson, Justifying the Capabilities Approach, supra note 176, at 83.
220 To illustrate how an equality-of-capabilities approach could violate fair treatment principles,
Sen gives an example based on the capability to live a long life. SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note
41, at 296. Because women live longer than men, a society committed exclusively to capability
equality could argue that men should receive more medical attention than women in order to equa-
lize the capability to live a long life. But this would, of course, "flagrantly violate a significant
requirement of process equity (in particular, treating different persons similarly in matters of life
and death)." Id.
221 RUGER, supra note 114, at 88-95.
222 Id. at 89.
223 Id at 61.
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and its impact on health functioning.22 4 Although this objective applies to all
individuals, Ruger's approach is prioritarian as well in that the "lower the indi-
vidual's ability for health functioning, the greater the moral importance of rais-
ing it is." 225
Because of its hybrid nature, shortfall equality is an appropriate stan-
dard for assessing inequalities in capabilities in the environmental justice con-
text. Once optimal levels for relevant flunctionings are established, policymakers
should identify and investigate the shortfalls from these levels and focus on ad-
dressing the greatest shortfalls. In evaluating policy options, policymakers
would therefore consider not just the aggregative consequences of different pol-
icies (i.e., the extent to which a policy advances the overall well-being of socie-
ty), but also the distributive consequences of different policies (i.e., the extent to
which a policy reduces existing shortfalls in individuals' well-being). I expand
upon both stages-investigating shortfalls and evaluating policy options-in the
next section.
IV. INVESTIGATING AND ADDRESSING CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS: POLICY
DESIGN AND EVALUATION
A. Policy Design: Understanding and Addressing Shortfalls
In order for environmental regulations to address the shortfalls in capa-
bilities resulting from environmental hazards, policymakers must first under-
stand the relationship between environmental factors, such as the presence of
hazardous waste sites, and capabilities. In the capability approach, environmen-
tal factors are "conversion factors" because they can influence the degree to
which individuals can convert goods and services into actual functionings.226
Other conversion factors include personal factors, such as physical disabilities,
and factors connected to a person's social environment, including social norms
and behaviors (e.g., gender norms, racial prejudice).227 As the environmental
justice movement has emphasized, the capabilities of individuals in minority
and low-income communities are often affected by a combination of these con-
version factors. Before policies can address the shortfalls in these communities,
224 Id. at 90.
225 Id. at 92.
226 See Ingrid Robeyns, Sen's Capability Approach and Feminist Concerns, in THE CAPABILITY
APPROACH, supra note 142, at 82, 84.
227 Id. at 84-85 ("The social conversion factors are determined by a number of societal aspects,
such as social institutions (e.g., the educational system, the political system, the family, etc.),
social norms (including gender norms, religious norms, cultural norms, moral norms), traditions,
and behavior of others in society (e.g., stereotyping, prejudiced behaviour, racism, sexism, homo-
phobic behaviour and so forth). . . . The personal conversion factors are determined by one's
mental and physical aspects.").
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we need to investigate and understand how environmental factors, alone and in
combination with other factors, affect these individuals' well-being. 2 28
One way to begin gathering this information is to use the capability ap-
proach to investigate underlying conditions and causes. The recent human de-
velopment report for the United States is one example. Like the UNDP Human
Development Report, the U.S. report contains a human development index that
measures the three dimensions of health, education, and standard of living using
specified indicators; the results are disaggregated by location (state and congres-
sional district), gender, race and ethnicity. 229 But the report contains more than
the quantitative indicators of health. It supplements these with a discussion of
the factors and conditions that contribute to and frustrate the health of different
groups and communities in the United States. For example, among the condi-
tions necessary for good health is a "safe, clean living environment." The report
highlights racial disparities in asthma hospitalization 23 0 and underscores the
environmental factors, such as pollution, poor housing, and poor public health
programs, that frustrate some children's ability to live a healthy life.23'
The report therefore does more than identify correlations among health
indicators and race (as well as location, gender, and ethnicity); it examines the
possible reasons, or mechanisms, behind these relationships. Research of this
nature seeks to understand the causal mechanisms that connect different va-
riables, such as life expectancy and race.232 Although positivist research, like the
human development indicators, can identify causal relationships, it cannot ex-
plain how and why these relationships happen.2 33 Both kinds of research are
important to the policymaker. As one scholar has explained, "[w]ithout estab-
lishing a causal relationship, one does not know which factors should be ad-
dressed by policy; without establishing the mechanism, one will not understand
how to address those factors."2 34 A correlation between life expectancy and
race may identify the factors policy should address, but it does not tell us how to
address this relationship.
228 Research and data collection regarding environmental justice communities is one of the
priorities identified in the Executive Order on environmental justice. Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 3-
3, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994) as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,948, 60 Fed. Reg. 6381
(Feb. 1, 1995).
229 THE MEASURE OF AMERICA, supra note 193, at 2-3. For example, to measure health, re-
searchers used a life expectancy indicator.
230 Id. at 68 ("African American children have a 250 percent higher rate of hospitalization for
asthma than white children and a 500 percent higher death rate.").
231 Id.
232 Ann Chih Lin, Bridging Positivist and Interpretivist Approaches to Qualitative Methods, 26
POL'Y STUD. J. 162, 163 (1998).
233 Id. at 167.
234 Id. at 165.
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Like the human development indicators, current tools for identifying
environmental justice communities23 5 allow users to gather data that may identi-
fy patterns, or causal relationships, among different variables. For example, the
publicly available mapping tool called "EJView" creates maps of geographic
areas with information on various factors, including pollution sources, levels of
pollution, demographic data, and health data.236 The Environmental Justice Stra-
tegic Enforcement Assessment Tool, currently under development, similarly
uses a range of indicators, including "census data, a respiratory hazard index,
poverty levels, toxic emissions, infant mortality, [and] an index of documented
pollution events," to identify low-income and minority communities that have
been disproportionately affected by environmental burdens.237
These tools are useful in that they can help identify communities that
suffer the worst deprivations in health-related and other capabilities due to mul-
tiple sources of pollution and other stressors. 238 But to design rules that effec-
tively address these deprivations, rulemakers need to understand the causal me-
chanisms behind these variables-the reasons, for example, that environmental
and health indicators are linked to race and income. How are minority and low-
income communities influenced by financial incentives, such as the prospect of
jobs provided by industrial facilities? How transparent is the regional permitting
process? How well are facilities monitored for compliance? Do people partici-
pate in local decision making? And how do environmental laws and regulations
affect these and other factors at the local level? Answers to these and similar
questions require qualitative research at the community level. 2 39
235 By "environmental justice community," I mean a community in which a significant number
of people are disproportionately limited in what they can do and be (i.e., their capabilities) as a
result of environmental policies.
236 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE GEOGRAPHIC ASSESSMENT TOOL,
(2011), available at http://epamap14.epa.gov/ejmap/entry.html.
237 Gayathri Vaidyanathan, EPA Developing Tool to Assist in Enviro Justice Initiative, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/07/30/greenwire-epa-developing-tool-
to-assist-in-enviro-justic- 1341.html?pagewated=all.
238 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 58 (2003)
(explaining that "geographically based measures of hazard are potentially useful cumulative
measures; although they do not provide information on the risks, the locations of hazards can be
used as an indicator of aggregate exposures and, thus, cumulative risks from all of the potential
chemicals associated with that site"), available at
http://www.epa.gov/raf/publications/pdfs/frmwrkcum-risk-assmnt.pdf.
239 In-depth studies at the community level can illuminate the mechanisms that connect conver-
sion factors and capability impacts (e.g., pollution sources and reduced life expectancy), as well as
the mechanisms that contribute to correlations between social factors, such as race, and environ-
mental factors, such as the siting of industrial facilities. Moreover, comparative studies of differ-
ent environmental justice communities can help policymakers identify common mechanisms
across communities and form policy solutions that address them. See Chih Lin, supra note 232, at
176-77. If, for example, comparative studies of certain communities with high rates of childhood
asthma hospitalizations show that children lack access to adequate health care because their par-
ents are unaware of state-sponsored insurance programs, national policies designed to disseminate
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B. Evaluating Policy Options
The integration of environmental justice concerns into early phases of
regulation as described above is essential. If rulemakers do not consider capabil-
ity impacts to vulnerable populations in identifying priorities and designing dif-
ferent regulatory options, they may fail to consider alternatives that reduce the
most significant shortfalls in people's capabilities. In fact, scholars have strong-
ly criticized the EPA for its failure to publicly consider meaningful alternatives
in the rulemaking process by analyzing, for example, only one alternative in
addition to the status quo in its economic analysis of costs and benefits.2 4 0 In-
corporating environmental justice into the policymaking agenda from the begin-
ning may increase the likelihood that alternatives are proposed that address
shortfall inequalities in health-related and other capabilities and that these short-
falls are specifically considered at key stages in the rulemaking process, such as
risk assessments and economic cost-benefit analyses. Moreover, when options
are finally proposed, the capability approach can complement other perspectives
or decision procedures, such as cost-benefit analysis, that are used to evaluate
the different proposals.
In this final section, I explain how the capability perspective can im-
prove the analysis of environmental justice impacts during the rulemaking
process. Because agencies are required to conduct economic cost-benefit ana-
lyses for significant regulatory actions and because these analyses dramatically
influence-and in many cases determine-which regulatory option is selected, I
focus on what a capability analysis can tell us in comparison to a cost-benefit
analysis. To underscore the ways in which the capability perspective on envi-
ronmental justice might be integrated into the rulemaking process, I end this
section with a critique of the EPA's approach to environmental justice in its
recent efforts to regulate coal ash as a hazardous material.
1. Capability Impact Analysis: Providing the Information Eco-
nomic Analyses Fail to Capture
Executive Order 12,866 directs federal agencies to assess the costs and
benefits of a proposed rule and to adopt the rule only when "the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs." 24 1 The Order also requires agencies to
submit regulatory analyses of "significant regulatory action[s]" to the Office of
information and educate parents might reduce hospitalizations. See THE MEASURE OF AMERICA,
supra note 193, at 67-68.
240 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 73, at 59-60, 62-64. Wagner argues that the EPA considered
only one alternative in its regulatory impact analysis of the Clean Air Interstate Rule in order to
reduce the rule's vulnerability in litigation; by analyzing only one alternative with a benefit-to-
cost ratio of at least 25 to 1, the "EPA positions its final rule as a legal and political no-brainer."
Id. at 59.
241 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(6), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
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Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") within the White House's Office
of Management and Budget ("OMB").242 After review, OIRA can send the reg-
ulatory analysis back to the agency for further consideration. In its guidance to
agencies conducting these analyses, OMB has emphasized the centrality of an
evaluation of costs and benefits to a regulatory analysis and has established
standards agencies should follow to measure and evaluate costs and benefits.2 43
The centrality of cost-benefit analysis ("CBA") to the rulemaking
process has been challenged on numerous grounds. Scholars of environmental
law and policy have questioned whether Congress has actually given agencies
the legal authority to make decisions based on CBA, particularly when envi-
ronmental statutes do not mention CBA and direct the EPA to make rules that
promote public health.24 In addition, scholars have argued that the primacy of
economic analyses privileges industry and other powerful interests at the ex-
pense of environmental and public health interests and that it results in less
stringent environmental regulation in practice. 2 45 Transparency is another con-
cern: the voluminous regulatory impact analyses contain technical information
accessible only to those with expert knowledge, raising concerns about the im-
pact of CBA on agencies' democratic accountability.24 6 In addition to these le-
gal and political concerns, scholars have raised theoretical concerns regarding
the way in which costs and benefits are monetized, noting in the environmental
context that benefits to public health and the environment are difficult and
sometimes impossible to reduce to a monetary metric.24 7
242 Id. § 6(a)(3)(C).
243 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-4 (2003)
[hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR A-4].
244 See, e.g., RCRA § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1984) ("The objectives of this chapter are
to promote the protection of health and the environment . . . ."); Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1977) (mandating the promulgation of primary ambient air quality standards
"requisite to protect the public health" within "an adequate margin of safety"); see also Daniel A.
Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1355, 1372 (2009) (ar-
guing that "[t]he general rule is that environmental statutes provide other regulatory standards and
do not allow EPA to base regulation on CBA"); David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neu-
tral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 342 (2006) (noting that statutes mandating health-based standard
setting sometimes preclude or downplay consideration of cost and statutes with technology-based
provisions require consideration of costs to determine whether a standard is feasible but do not
require CBA).
245 See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 179; Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder,
Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 433, 451
(2008) (citing studies that support the conclusion that CBA routinely results in less stringent regu-
lation in favor of industry); Driesen, supra note 244, at 365-66 (reviewing twenty-five cases of
CBA and OMB review in rulemaking and finding that OMB suggested changes that weakened
regulation in twenty-four cases).
246 See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 68, at 80-81 (noting that "CBA will often consign decisions to
the largely unchecked discretion of officials or private economists making the policy choices that
generate the numbers in the CBA").
247 See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN, POISONED FOR PENNIES: THE ECONOMICS OF TOXICS AND
PRECAUTION (2008); FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
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Because the scholarship in this area has thoroughly documented the
concerns surrounding CBA, including the serious objections to its application in
the context of environmental rulemaking, I need not discuss them in detail here.
From the standpoint of environmental justice, the most obvious concern is that
CBA does not illuminate the distributional effects of a proposed rule. The objec-
tive of CBA is to identify the "most efficient alternative, that is, the alternative
that generates the largest net benefits to society (ignoring distributional ef-
fects)." 2 48 CBA's proponents readily concede that it is designed to assess
whether a policy option will advance the welfare of society as a whole and can-
not provide the information necessary to assess how an option will affect partic-
ular groups. 2 49 But as critics have long lamented, because of CBA's central role
in regulatory analysis, distributional effects receive little consideration in the
rulemaking process. 2 50 Moreover, even if the costs and benefits to certain popu-
lations could be quantified and considered, CBA would still fail to assess fully
how a proposed rule would actually affect human lives because it does not re-
quire public involvement in specifying the impacts of most importance and it
cannot necessarily monetize all these impacts. Because CBA leaves out all of
this information, it obscures the ways in which policy choices are morally sig-
nificant choices.
If the capability approach is applied, as outlined above, it can supply the
information that CBA does not. It can identify distributional effects, namely
shortfall inequalities in capabilities. Moreover, because it provides a richer in-
formational base, it can capture the range of impacts to human lives. Because
communities of concern are involved in the process by which the central capa-
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); see also Amy Sinden, In Defense of Abso-
lutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1423-30
(2005) (summarizing the methodological and theoretical objections to the monetization of costs
and benefits).
248 OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 243, at 2.
249 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 237 (2007) (acknowledging that to know
whether we can justify a policy on redistributive grounds, "we need to go beyond CBA and to
identify the winners and losers"); MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 156-57 (2006) (conceding that CBA does not "track" egalitarian values
and agencies must use "decision rules other than CBA" to incorporate distributive considerations
into administrative decision making). As critics have noted, CBA does not simply fail to consider
distributional issues; it may, in fact, justify unequal distributions. Because benefits are usually
measured in terms of people's willingness to pay for environmental measures-and the wealthy
are willing to pay more than the poor-CBA will justify unequal distribution of environmental
hazards, imposing burdens on the poor as a matter of economic logic. See ACKERMAN, POISONED
FOR PENNIES: THE EcoNoMICs OF TOXICS AND PRECAUTION, supra note 247, at 21-22 (explaining
how CBA "rationalizes" the unequal distribution of environmental burdens). But see ADLER &
POSNER, supra, at 157 (noting that CBA could incorporate distributive weights to offset differenc-
es in the marginal utility of money based on wealth, but questioning whether this idea is actually
feasible).
250 See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 244, at 398-99 (arguing that a mandate to employ CBA af-
fects what agencies consider in that it "makes some arguments more important than others" and
"some considerations central and others irrelevant").
2011] 97
49
Roesler: Addressing Environmental Injustices: A Capability Approach to Rul
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
bility impacts of a given proposal are identified, the capability perspective is
transparent and inclusive (i.e., it does not fail to consider key impacts because
they cannot be monetized). And unlike CBA, the capability perspective incorpo-
rates people's values and does not commit itself to full order rankings identify-
ing the best option (which, in the case of CBA, would be the "most efficient"
option). Because the capability approach can result in partial order rankings, one
option may not be clearly better than another. In these situations, the capability
approach illuminates an important reality-that the choice among options is a
morally significant choice requiring further moral and political deliberation.
As Martha Nussbaum has explained, CBA cannot answer the "tragic
question," namely whether any of the options under consideration is morally
acceptable. 25 1 To answer the tragic question requires a moral theory that identi-
fies the basic entitlements of citizens (e.g., her list of central capabilities); an
alternative that violates one of these entitlements would be morally unaccepta-
ble and removed from consideration.252 The capability approach to environmen-
tal justice that I propose would not only identify violations of central capabili-
ties (e.g., increasing the shortfall inequality of a minority population's ability to
live a normal lifespan would be a clear violation), but also illuminate the extent
to which different options expand or contract different capabilities. In other
words, even if all the options are morally acceptable, the capability perspective
can enable deliberation regarding which option or options are morally prefera-
ble.
Alkire's study of the three development projects in Pakistan is an exam-
ple of how the capability approach can complement economic analyses by
enriching the information available to decision makers and illuminating the
moral significance of choices. 253 She uses both a cost-benefit analysis and a
capability analysis to evaluate three Oxfam-funded projects designed to generate
income in poor communities: a project that provided women with loans to pur-
chase goats; an educational program designed to further women's literacy and
251 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 169, 171 (Mat-
thew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001). Similarly, Catherine O'Neill has emphasized the
ways in which CBA obscures moral judgments regarding distributive justice:
Rather than undertake a sober discussion whether we as a society can support
these consequences-whether we can tolerate a particular instance of distribu-
tive injustice, a particular affront to human dignity or cultural integrity-
decisions made by means of cost-benefit analysis are made without reference
to who is affected and without reference to what is at stake from their perspec-
tive. . . . [C]ost-benefit analysis sanitizes the result, assuring us that "society"
is better off, declining even to entertain questions of distribution and generally
glossing over the fact that the losers do not actually get compensated (if in-
deed compensation were possible for what is lost here).
O'Neill, Risk Avoidance, supra note 124, at 346-47.
252 See Nussbaum, supra note 251, at 188.
253 ALKIRE, supra note 188, at 233-87.
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ultimately teach income-generating skills; and a rose-cultivation project in
which participants generated income by making and selling garlands. 25 4 Using
CBA, the goat project is clearly superior to the other projects because it generat-
ed the most income relative to its costs. But the result is quite different when the
three projects are assessed in terms of their capability impact, that is, in terms of
how they expanded or contracted the capabilities identified by program partici-
pants. For example, although the literacy project did not generate significant
income, it had the strongest impact on capabilities in the dimensions of empo-
werment and knowledge, "intangible benefits" not considered in the cost-benefit
analysis.2 55 Indeed, based on the capability analyses, the three projects cannot be
ranked; choosing among them is therefore a "morally significant choice" be-
cause it is a choice to prefer one value over another (economic efficiency vs.
women's empowerment).256
This added informational perspective is essential if we are to take envi-
ronmental justice seriously in the rulemaking process. The OMB circular some-
what begrudgingly acknowledges that the Executive Order on regulatory analy-
sis requires agencies to consider distributive effects:
Your regulatory analysis should provide a separate description
of distributional effects (i.e., how both benefits and costs are
distributed among sub-populations of particular concern) so that
decision makers can properly consider them along with the ef-
fects on economic efficiency. . . . Where distributive effects are
thought to be important, the effects of various regulatory alter-
natives should be described quantitatively to the extent possible,
including the magnitude, likelihood, and severity of impacts on
particular groups.257
Of course, the approach contemplated in the circular is one in which
distributive impacts are monetized and integrated into the cost-benefit analysis.
But as Alkire's study demonstrates, even if some costs and benefits can be mo-
netized or otherwise quantified, these numbers will not fully reflect the positive
and negative impacts to vulnerable populations. For example, capability im-
pacts, such as increased or decreased access to information regarding one's en-
vironment, may evade quantification. In current regulatory analyses, these kinds
of intangible benefits are given scant attention, even though they may under-
254 Id. at 235, 256, 272-73.
255 Id. at 286. Alkire acknowledges that these benefits might in theory be reduced to monetary
values, but in addition to being arbitrary, the valuation "seems to obscure rather than clarify the
question of whether or not capabilities have expanded, because if benefits are priced and aggre-
gated then information about what these benefits were is lost, and might only be represented by a
total sum." Id. at 255. In short, the qualitative description of these benefits is essential.
256 Id. at 286.
257 OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 243, at 14.
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mine the reliability of the cost-benefit comparisons at the center of the analy-
sis.258 As the EPA's recent environmental justice guidance and action plan rec-
ognize, we need more than the open-ended requirements found in executive
orders if environmental justice is to receive serious consideration; we need a
theoretical framework that can generate processes by which inequalities are sys-
tematically identified and addressed.
Capability impact analysis fills this need because it can ensure that rules
are assessed not only in terms of efficiency, but also in terms of human impacts.
If, for example, a capability impact analysis of vulnerable groups had been con-
ducted as part of the EPA's rulemaking process for the 2008 DSW rule, it likely
would have identified impacts to capabilities in the dimensions of knowledge
and empowerment. The rule excludes large amounts of hazardous material from
stringent regulation under subtitle C of RCRA. 2 59  As a result, some facilities
managing hazardous material no longer require a RCRA permit. Without the
permit requirement, regulatory authorities and facilities do not have to consider
public input or facilitate public participation, and individuals lose the ability to
influence whether and how facilities operate in their communities.260
In addition, facilities claiming the exclusion are no longer subject to the
RCRA requirement that hazardous waste generators and treatment, storage or
disposal facilities ("TSDFs") report biennially to the EPA. 2 6' The 2008 DSW
rule only requires that facilities notify the EPA biennially of their intent to oper-
ate under a DSW exclusion and does not require that facilities report the detailed
information on waste generation, management, and transport required under the
hazardous waste reporting requirements.26 2 Consequently, individuals, and par-
ticularly those in low-income and minority communities where hazardous waste
facilities are disproportionately located, will not be able to access important
258 See Wagner, supra note 73, at 64-65. Wagner notes that "when a good portion of the bene-
fits are unquantifiable, prominent economists maintain that cost-benefit analysis is no longer
appropriate." Id. at 65.
259 DSW Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,668 (2008).
260 The EPA's recent environmental justice analysis of the 2008 DSW rule identifies the nega-
tive impact that the 2008 rule has on public participation. See Definition of Solid Waste, 76 Fed.
Reg. 44,094-01, 44,106 (July 22, 2011) ("[B]y removing the RCRA permitting requirement for
facilities that manage excluded hazardous secondary materials, the 2008 DSW final rule also
removed one of the key provisions for allowing communities to participate in the regulatory
process (at least as it concerns the management of the hazardous secondary materials excluded
under the rule).").
261 RCRA §§ 3002, 3004, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922(a), 6924(a); 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.41-43, 264.75-.77
(2009).
262 Notification Requirement for Hazardous Secondary Materials, 40 C.F.R. § 260.42 (2009).
For a summary of notifications through January 12, 2010, see EPA, DRAFT EJ METHODOLOGY,
supra note 10, at app. C. The recently proposed revisions to the DSW rule do not completely cure
these deficiencies. The proposed revisions continue to exclude some hazardous material from
subtitle C regulation; facilities operating under these exclusions are not required to acquire RCRA
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information about the hazardous material subject to the DSW exclusions. Indi-
viduals engaged in the iterative, participatory process described above would
likely identify these restrictions on their ability to access information and partic-
ipate in siting decisions as a negative impact on their well-being in addition to
the more obvious impacts to health and peace of mind that would occur if dere-
gulation actually increases the risk of environmental and human exposure to
hazardous materials. 263
2. Critique of Current Methodologies: The EPA's Proposed Coal
Ash Rule
The capability approach can also be used to critique current practices
and methods of evaluation by highlighting information a particular methodology
fails to take into account and asking how this information might influence ulti-
mate conclusions.26 4 In this final section, I examine the environmental justice
analysis conducted by the EPA in its regulatory impact analysis ("RIA") of its
proposals to regulate coal combustion residuals ("CCRs"), often referred to as
coal ash.265 The very fact that the EPA conducted such an analysis and included
it in the RIA is a notable improvement over past practices. In the past, environ-
mental justice has been given cursory mention in the RIA, rather than analysis.
But with the Agency's renewed commitment to environmental justice, we can
move beyond calls to incorporate it into rulemaking to actual discussions about
how best to do so.
The proposed CCR regulation is an apropos focus for such a discussion
given its potential environmental justice implications. CCRs, such as fly ash and
boiler slag, are residues produced during the combustion of coal at electric utili-
ties and independent power producers.26 6 Currently, they are disposed of in
landfills or-in liquid or slurry form-in surface impoundments, which the pro-
posed regulation defines as "a natural topographic depression, man-made exca-
vation, or diked area formed primarily of earthen materials." 267 CCRs contain a
number of contaminants, such as lead, arsenic, mercury and other toxic metals,
263 The concern that deregulation will increase the risk of improper storage and disposal of
hazardous material is the principal objection of environmental groups. See EPA, DRAFT EJ
METHODOLOGY, supra n. 10.
264 See Robeyns, Capability Approach in Practice, supra note 170, at 369 (describing her own
work "question[ing] whether some success stories of economic globalisation remain positive if
one looks beyond increases in personal incomes and GNP per capita, and instead takes social and
psychological functionings into account").
265 Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128 (pro-
posed June 21, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261, 264, 265, 268, 271, 302) [herei-
nafter CCR Rule].
266 id
267 Id. at 35,130.
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that pose risks to human health and the environment.268 Without proper controls,
people can be exposed to these contaminants through the air or as they leach
into groundwater and travel overland via erosion and runoff.2 6 9 Improper man-
agement of CCRs can also result in catastrophic releases, such as the massive
spill of fly ash that occurred in December 2008 at the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority ("TVA") Fossil Plant in Kingston, Tennessee, when a surface impound-
ment failed and 5.4 million cubic yards of fly ash sludge spread over 300 acres,
eventually spilling into a branch of the Emory River.270 In addition to environ-
mental damage to the river and surrounding water and land, the spill "disrupted
power, ruptured a gas line, knocked one home off its foundation and damaged
others."2 7 1
To address these health and environmental risks, the EPA proposed two
options: (1) regulation of CCRs disposed of in landfills and surface impound-
ments as "special wastes" under subtitle C of RCRA and (2) less stringent regu-
lation of these CCRs according to national minimum criteria under subtitle D of
RCRA. 2 72 Under option one, CCRs would be subject to regulation from genera-
tion to disposal (i.e., generally subject to the cradle-to-grave requirements for
hazardous wastes under subtitle C), and facilities treating, storing, and disposing
of CCRs would need to obtain permits.273 In contrast, under option two, the
268 The EPA has identified the following metals present in CCRs: "antimony, arsenic, barium,
beryllium, cadmium, hexavalent chromium, lead, mercury, nickel, selenium, silver, and thallium."
Id. at 35,168. The agency concluded that these metals are "capable of posing a substantial present
or potential hazard to human health and the environment when improperly treated, stored, trans-
ported, disposed of, or otherwise managed." Id.
269 The exposure pathways evaluated by the EPA are groundwater ingestion and air inhalation
by nearby residents and fish consumption by recreational fishers. Id. at 35,168.
270 Id. at 35,147; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, QUARTERLY FACT SHEET: TVA
KINGSTON FLY ASH RELEASE SITE, HARRIMAN, ROANE COUNTY, TENNESSEE (2010) (containing a




Prompted by this disaster, the EPA sought to identify the locations of existing surface impound-
ments. Out of the 431 units identified, the EPA assigned a "high hazard potential rating" to 49
sites; this rating is an indication that a structural failure of an impoundment will likely result in
loss of human life. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUES
(CCR)-SURFACE IMPOUNDMENTS WITH HIGH HAZARD POTENTIAL RATINGS (Aug. 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/nonhaz/industrial/special/fossil/ccrs-fs/index.htm.
271 CCR Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,147.
272 The EPA also considered a modified (weaker) version of the second option. For summaries
of the options, see the CCR Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,133-34. The EPA is proposing that CCRs be
designated as "special wastes," rather than "hazardous wastes," in order to address the concern
raised by industry that regulation as a hazardous waste will stigmatize their beneficial reuse. Id. at
35,185-87. In addition to environmental groups and scholars, the EPA itself questions this claim,
noting that the increased cost to dispose of CCRs in accordance with subtitle C should provide an
economic incentive for unregulated, less costly beneficial uses. Id. at 35,185.
273 Id. at 35,133; 35,135.
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EPA would establish national minimum criteria under subtitle D for surface
impoundments and landfills, but would not regulate the generation, treatment, or
storage of CCRs prior to disposal.274 In addition, under subtitle D, permits
would not be required and the EPA could not enforce the requirements; en-
forcement would be left to citizens and states under RCRA's citizen-suit author-
ity.275 Furthermore, if regulated under subtitle C, the practice of disposing of
CCRs in liquid or slurry form in surface impoundments would effectively cease
due to applicable treatment standards, which would require "dewatering" of
CCRs and result in dry disposal in landfills.276 Under subtitle D, the disposal of
CCRs in surface impoundments could continue if impoundments meet certain
design requirements, including the installation of liner systems. 2 77 Regulation
under subtitle C is clearly more protective of the environment and public health.
Not surprisingly, environmental groups favor more stringent regulation under
subtitle C, while industry and many states have pressed for regulation under
subtitle D.
The RIA's environmental justice analysis of the proposed regulation
consists primarily of a demographic analysis of the areas surrounding the 495
electric utilities potentially affected by the regulation.2 78 The main objective of
the analysis is to "compare minority and low-income population data for each
electric utility plant location, to respective statewide [and nationwide] popula-
tion data, to identify whether these two population subgroups disproportionately
reside in geographic areas where electric utility plants are located." 27 9 Using
census data on minority and low-income populations based on zip code tabula-
tion areas, the EPA compared the low-income and minority populations sur-
rounding utility plants to statewide averages of these subgroups. 280 The Agency
also aggregated the plant-level data to make comparisons at the state and na-
tional levels.2 81
274 Id. at 35,133-34; 35,136.
275 Id. at 35,136.
276 Id. at 35,180; 35,202.
277 Id. at 35,202.
278 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR EPA's PROPOSED RCRA
REGULATION OF COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUES (CCR) GENERATED BY THE ELECTRIC UTILITY
INDUSTRY 216-28 (Apr. 30, 2010) [hereinafter CCR RIA]. The EPA gathered population (census)
data for 464 (94%) of the utilities and "extrapolated" the data to all 495 utilities. CCR Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. at 35,229.
279 CCR RIA, supra note 278, at 216. The analysis also contains a qualitative discussion of the
subtitle C option's potential to cause an increase in off-site disposal of CCRs in hazardous waste
landfills, recognizing that such an increase would disproportionately affect low-income and mi-
nority populations given the well-documented location of such landfills.
280 Id. at 217; CCR Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,229.
281 CCR RIA, supra note 278, at 219-223; CCR Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,229-30.
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Overall, the comparisons indicate that electric utilities are located in
areas with slightly higher low-income populations and lower minority popula-
tions.28 2 This finding led the EPA to the following conclusion:
These demographic data comparisons indicate that the current
(baseline) environmental and human health hazards and risks
from electric utility CCR disposal units, and the expected future
effects (i.e., benefits and costs) of the regulatory options de-
scribed in today's co-proposal may have a disproportionately
lower effect on minority populations and may have a dispropor-
tionately higher effect on low-income populations.28 3
In other words, many environmental justice communities are not disproportio-
nately affected by CCR surface impoundments, and the case for increased regu-
lation is therefore not notably strengthened by analyzing it from an environmen-
tal justice perspective.
But is this the correct conclusion? Even if we accept the methodology
used to collect and analyze the demographic data, what do these numbers actual-
ly tell us about the impact of different policy options on the lives of vulnerable
populations? An environmental justice analysis grounded in the capability pers-
pective would likely lead to a less positive assessment of the status quo. A cata-
strophic spill would more seriously affect environmental justice populations, as
the aftermaths of Hurricane Katrina and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill demon-
strate, because these populations may be, for example, less mobile and therefore
less able to avoid exposure. Hence, the risks posed by surface impoundments
may be disproportionately distributed even if a catastrophe never occurs.
Moreover, the risks posed by exposure to toxic metals, such as arsenic
and lead, may be greater for these populations because of the additive and cu-
mulative effects of exposure to multiple chemicals and sources of pollution.
Although the EPA's probabilistic risk assessment addressed variability in hu-
man exposure by using statistical distributions, the EPA's exposure modeling is
based on "default assumptions concerning population activity patterns, mobility,
dietary habits, body weights, and other factors."28 4 In addition, exposure data
are often uncertain. In this case, the EPA used a Maine study of fish consump-
tion rates by anglers, which it admitted may under- or over-estimate fish con-
285
sumption rates at relevant sites. Indeed, as discussed in previous sections, the
exposure of vulnerable populations may be greater as a result of higher levels of
fish consumption. Furthermore, because the risk of each toxic chemical is con-
282 CCR RIA, supra note 278, at 226; CCR Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,229-30.
283 CCR Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,230.
284 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RiSK ASSESSMENT OF COAL
COMBUSTION WASTES § 4, at 53 (Apr. 2010) (draft).
285 Id § 4, at 54.
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sidered separately, cumulative and synergistic risks from multiple chemicals
were not considered, although the risk assessment acknowledges that exposure
to multiple chemicals is "highly likely." 28 6
What this demonstrates is that when we focus on human impacts, rather
than the distribution of electric utilities, the environmental justice analysis may
provide support for the stronger regulatory option. Focusing on actual lives,
rather than "things," enriches the analysis. If one surface impoundment fails,
low-income and minority individuals are more likely to suffer serious and pro-
longed harm. If groundwater or air is contaminated, the health impacts will like-
ly be greater due to exposure to multiple stressors and economic and social vul-
nerabilities, such as inadequate health care. Focusing on the distribution of a
particular facility or pollution source will not capture all we need to know to
assess these potential impacts.
Moreover, the language of environmental justice contained in Executive
Order 12,898 and the EPA's policy documents does not require the approach
used for the CCR rule. Identifying and addressing "disproportionately high and
adverse human health and environmental effects" 287 does not first require statis-
tical proof that pollution sources are disproportionately located in low-income
and minority communities. The Executive Order does require, when possible,
the collection and analysis of demographic data for areas surrounding facilities
or sites "expected to have substantial environmental, human health, or economic
effects on the surrounding populations" when these facilities or sites are the
subject of substantial administrative action.2 88 But although this data may be
useful, it is not all we need to know-and the Executive Order does not suggest
that it is all we need to do.
Furthermore, as the environmental justice analysis for the CCR rule
demonstrates, if we rely on this demographic data, we may overlook important
concerns. Even if pollution sources are not disproportionately located in minori-
ty and low-income communities, environmental justice concerns may neverthe-
286 Id. § 4, at 45. Although the environmental justice analysis for the 2008 DSW rule is primari-
ly a demographic analysis, it does recognize that cumulative effects from multiple stressors can
exacerbate the disproportionate impacts identified by the demographic analysis. Definition of
Solid Waste, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,094-01, 44,107 (July 22, 2011). In addition, the EPA compiled data
on multiple stressors and other factors that affect vulnerability in the communities surrounding the
forty facilities that have notified that they are operating under an exclusion created by the 2008
DSW rule. This data provided further support for the EPA's conclusion that the 2008 DSW rule
may have adverse and disproportionate impacts on minority and low-income populations. See
Definition of Solid Waste, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,106-07 (citing U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY,
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION OF SOLID WASTE RULE, § 5.2, table 5.1
(June 30, 2011) (draft for public comment)). By analyzing factors that affect vulnerability, the
EPA's analysis of the 2008 DSW rule moves closer to a capability impact analysis. This is an
important addition to the Agency's environmental justice methodology and one that the Agency
should continue to strengthen and develop in evaluating future policies.
287 Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1-101, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994), as amended by Exec.
Order No. 12,948, 60 Fed. Reg. 6381 (Feb. 1, 1995).
288 Id. § 3-302(b).
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less exist. As we have seen, equal exposure to particular environmental hazards
does not necessarily lead to equal distribution of environmental and health con-
sequences because social vulnerabilities connected to race and class increase the
likelihood that environmental risks and hazards will result in unequal outcomes.
Robert Verchick makes this point in the context of disaster justice:
Imagine requiring that only vulnerable communities with un-
equal risk of direct exposure be given special thought in the
planning process. That policy would do nothing for the wheel-
chair-bound grandfather on a fixed income whose healthy
neighbors (with a car in the garage) are also exposed to the risk
of flood.28 9
To address this potential problem, he argues for an executive order on disaster
justice that would require agencies to address disproportionate or serious ad-
290
verse effects on vulnerable populations.
But we may not need a new order or new language to empower agencies
to address what Verchick calls "serious adverse effects." 2 9 1 Rather, we need
only shift our focus from things to people-from the distribution of environ-
mental goods and bads to how these goods and bads affect actual lives-to un-
cover the disproportionate impacts that some individuals suffer. Indeed, given
the substantial evidence that environmental risks and hazards disproportionately
affect the well-being of low-income and minority individuals, the EPA and oth-
er agencies may be able to justify an environmental justice assumption in the
context of some rulemakings.292 The environmental justice analysis would then
begin not with the question of where pollution sources are located, but with the
question of how these sources affect vulnerable populations.
V. CONCLUSION
As a result of many years of advocacy by activists and scholars, we can
finally move beyond debates regarding the existence of environmental injustice
to productive discussions regarding what law and policy can do to address the
289 VERCHICK, supra note 157, at 174-5.
290 Id. at 173-77.
291 Id. at 73. In its recent guidance on environmental justice in rulemaking, the EPA interprets
its statutory authority in a way that supports this approach. The EPA emphasizes the Agency's
broad discretion under environmental statutes to consider health and environmental impacts on
certain populations without demonstrating that they are disproportionate and concludes that "con-
sistent with its mission, the Agency may address adverse impacts in the context of developing an
action without the need for showing that the impacts are disproportionate." EPA, INTERIM EJ
GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 5.
292 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1420-21 n.63 (D.C. Cir.
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injustice. The EPA's recently released interim guidance on environmental jus-
tice will encourage rulemakers to consider environmental injustice during the
rulemaking process, but it does not help rulemakers assess, or evaluate, these
injustices. To evaluate environmental inequalities so that policies may better
address them, we must adopt an approach that ensures we consider the most
important information-that is, information regarding the ways in which vul-
nerable populations actually experience environmental injustice. The geographic
distribution of pollution sources and other environmental hazards is relevant, but
it is not the entire story. To understand the impact of environmental policies and
practices on human lives, we must shift our focus from things to people. By
focusing on the opportunities people actually have to achieve good health,
community involvement, and other valuable functionings, the capability ap-
proach to environmental rulemaking can ensure we see the real-world impacts
of environmental burdens, leading to better policy choices and more just envi-
ronmental rules.
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